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Translations From MILITAER WESSEN (HLS)

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Translations from MILITAERWESIN (45)

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GREATER MATERIAL ECONOMY IN NVA URGED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 3-10

[Editorial by Col H. Zipfel, historian]

/Text/ Since the 13th conference of the central committee of the SED, the demand for a noticeably higher work effectiveness¹ has been the starting point for many initiatives carried out in all social domains, and thus also in the National People's Army, in the interest of achieving an all-round strengthening of the GDR. Members of the Army and civilian employees have since then been making more purposeful and more consistent efforts to put the material and financial means as well as the time available to them for military service and work to optimum use.

Creative Initiatives of Army Personnel and Civilian Employees

At the conference of NVA commanders held in January of this year, the minister for national defense, Army General Heinz Hoffmann, demanded that "...material and financial resources and, particularly also, the time required for training purposes be utilized more effectively for political and combat training in order to bring about an increase in the fighting strength of all units and troop formations...."²

The assignment of this task has produced in all troop formations and units new initiatives for the development of economical thinking and acting in the military sphere. Thus, the motor vehicle and tank drivers of the Friedrich Wolf formation pledged themselves to care for and to service their vehicles in such an exemplary manner that their stipulated running times will be maintained and even surpassed. Replacement parts, fuel,

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and other pertinent items are to be planned for, put to use, or consumed in a more correct, circumspect, and responsible manner. The military personnel of the Baumann formation are showing much initiative in improving and readying their training base. The civilian drivers are using individual accounting methods and consumption norms for keeping records on motor vehicle replacement parts, tires, fuel, and lubricants. As a result of improved organization or work procedures, air force personnel are completing repair jobs in less time than called for by pertinent technical stipulations applying for each aircraft. In many workshops it has been possible to reduce the time required for repair work and, in addition, to achieve material savings through reclamation of parts. The workmen in the Ehlerz troop formation propose to save 41,000 marks in 1975 through economical use of materials and energy. The innovator movement is receiving a new impetus from the 13th congress and from the task assignment by the minister for national defense. In the 1973/74 training year, 18,800 members of the army and civilian employees had already participated in the innovator movement. They submitted 14,200 innovations.³ The results achieved and the projects planned by the innovator movement are making a considerable contribution to raising the level of our fighting strength and combat readiness and to an effective utilization of the material and monetary resources and of the time available to us for defense purposes.

It becomes apparent from all these activities that the requirement for maximum effectiveness makes high demands on the ability of the members of our army, and primarily of the officers, to be creatively active to an increasing extent, to awaken the initiative of subordinates and colleagues, and to achieve maximum gain with a minimum of expenditure.

Conversion of Resources into Fighting Strength and Combat Readiness

One of the factors significantly influencing the military-economic superiority of socialism is the effectiveness with which the resources which have been made available for national defense are utilized and applied for purposes of reinforcing our fighting strength and raising the level of our combat readiness. In contrast to imperialism, socialism enjoys new and qualitatively decisive advantages in this respect also.

Under the leadership of the party of the working class, and on the basis of socialist production conditions, there is developing also in the armed forces considerable initiative for an effective utilization of material and financial resources as well as of available time. In contrast to the situation obtaining in the imperialist military forces, there exist in the socialist armed forces mass-effective, society-related motives for the most rational management of time and means available for national defense. The striving for effectiveness and economical usage, which is inherent in the nature of our socialist society, is at work in all spheres of our society, and thus also in the sphere of our military forces. It creates additional potentialities which are possible only under socialism.

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Our society's ownership of the means of production and the power and dynamic quality of the socialist planned economy which is based on it, as well as the application thereof in the sphere of military activity; the systematic realization of the economic and military-economic laws in the socialist armed forces; the deepening comradeship-in-arms with the socialist fraternal armies, and especially with the Soviet Army--all these and other objective factors are bringing it about that, with respect to the exploitation of the available resources, there can be achieved in our socialist national defense a completely new quality level as compared with that which exists in the imperialist military camp. And that is the objective toward which the development of our economical thinking and acting in the military sphere is oriented--a conscious utilization of the advantages of socialism!

Military-economic Thinking and Acting by the Socialist Armed Forces

Military-economic thinking and acting has been a continuing task in the socialist military forces ever since their inception. As early as in 1920, V. I. Lenin had demanded in his "Draft Guidelines for Management of Soviet Institutions" that efforts must be made to ensure that the national defense of the Soviet republics is carried out with the greatest economy in energy expenditure and with the most productive input of the work of the people. During the years of the civil war, in the period of building up modern military forces prior to World War II, and especially during the Great Patriotic War, economical thinking and acting in the Soviet Army and Navy constituted an important component part of military activity and a victory factor.

In their written works and memoirs, leading Soviet military personalities and military scientists point out over and over again how important mastery of economical practices by armed forces is for achieving victory. Thus, for instance, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov wrote the following in the preamble of Lt General Antipenko's book entitled "In the Primary Direction": "In war, the economical use of personnel and material reserves has always been and will always be one of the decisive problems."⁵

In conjunction with the advances made in the scientific-technological field, and with the revolution in the military sphere, there have evolved new demands on the development of economical thinking and acting in the military sphere. "Any problem of military development is today at the same time also an economic problem....It is understandable...that a more effective utilization of material and human resources and a careful handling of weapons, equipment, and army property can become a source of considerable additional means for maintaining the army and navy and for achieving a further increase in the combat readiness of the troops."⁶

From the quantitatively and particularly also qualitatively higher defense funds (armaments, equipment, supplies), there result objectively higher

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demands on our economical thinking and acting in the military sphere with respect to utilization, care, maintenance, repair work, and the use of existing or new equipment. By the same token, there result objectively greater tasks for the military-economic work of the armed forces from the growing demands made by national defense considerations on material services (transportation, communications, and repair services) as well as on non-material services (scientific-technological work results; cultural and educational achievements).

Increasing demands on economical thinking and acting in the military sphere also result with respect to the economical use of the fiscal means made available for our military protection. Increasing military-economic demands on leadership personnel in all spheres result in connection with the provision of financial support for all political and military tasks, with the carrying through of effective fiscal controls, and with making sure that there is provision for such wages, military pay, bonus payments, and social care services for armed forces personnel and civilian employees as are commensurate with their performance and which stimulate performance.

People who have been educated in the socialist society are the decisive factor with which all demands can be met. Their state of being highly informed, the considerable scope of their political, technical, and occupational knowledge, and the level of development of the political awareness of the members of our army create favorable conditions for developing "a new type of soldier--the ideologically convinced, flaming patriot and internationalist and the highly competent military specialist, the armed defender of socialism,"⁷ who, in effectively utilizing defense funds and work and service time, generates a new type of creative force and initiative which is entirely unknown to imperialism.

High Demands on Ideological Work

The fulfillment of this task sets higher standards for ideological work and for the exercise of political and military leadership. Realization of this demand and achievement of greater gains in the interest of raising our fighting strength and combat readiness level from each mark expended, from each gram of material, from each hour of service or work time is a very exacting undertaking. Lively, high-level politico-ideological educational work is needed for organizing and mobilizing the active and initiative participation of our armed forces personnel and civilian employees in the work of realizing the objective economic and military-economic requirements. It must be aimed at the provision of information on basic politico-economic and military-economic problems and at creative handling of economic and military-economic problems and of the tasks posed by the party decisions and by the basic military documents.

During the current training year, a considerable contribution to the scientific-theoretical validation of military-economic thinking and acting is

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being made in the sphere of advanced socio-scientific education. It is aimed at a deepening of the politico-economic and military-economic knowledge of all participants and is contributing to a deepening of their ideological insights and their sense of responsibility as socialist owners and armed defenders of the socialist national wealth. Beyond this, the officers, officer candidates, and career noncommissioned officers must be enabled to apply such basic socialist economic principles as effectiveness, methodology, and thrift. This includes taking a critical and thorough look at the military-economic circumstances in one's own sphere of activity. All forms of politico-ideological work with army personnel and civilian employees are therefore to be aimed even more purposefully and more effectively at developing initiative and creativity in the military-economic sphere and in the innovator movement.

A complete understanding of the military-economic tasks on the part of army personnel and civilian employees is the most important prerequisite for realizing the objective-military-economic requirements. Fully applicable in this connection is the following general statement made by L. I. Brezhnev on the subject of knowledge of economic laws: "The idea that only important scientists and leading personalities have anything to do with the laws governing economy is erroneous. If there is a proper understanding of them, these laws dictate logic in connection with the actions of not only the manager, the scientist, the engineer, and the technician, but also of those of each simple worker and kolkhoz farmer."⁸ For us in the armed forces this means the following: Basic knowledge concerning the inevitable laws governing economy in the military sphere must be imparted to all army personnel. As a result of this, economical and effective management, thrift, and intelligent deliberation in connection with the use of material and financial means and of available time must become solid thinking and acting practices in the case of all army personnel and civilian employees.

In connection with evaluating the 13th conference of the central committee of the SED, the basic organizations and party groups consulted on how the effectiveness and quality of our military activities can be increased. Decisions were made to assign concrete tasks for making better use of material and fiscal resources as well as of time spent for service duties and work, the objective being the raising of the level of our fighting strength and combat readiness. The manifold efforts and initiatives undertaken by army personnel and civilian employees in order to carry out the tasks set for them by the minister for national defense have been and are being fully appreciated.

Optimum Results and Effectiveness Are A Basic Socialist Military Leadership Principle

Many party organizations were entirely correct in recognizing that, in the sphere of socialist military leadership, application of the optimum-results

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and effectiveness principle is becoming even more important for achieving victory in a possible war. When today evaluating the experiences gathered by the Soviet Army and Navy in the Great Patriotic War, it is particularly important for us to learn how to use personnel and military equipment in such a manner as to defeat the enemy in as short a time as possible. Scientific guidance of the political, military, ideological, economic, and spiritual processes taking place in the socialist armed forces under any conditions, in peace as well as in war, includes the most economical use possible of all material and financial means. In this connection, such guidance relies on the efforts of the members of the armed forces as well as of the civilian employees and makes use of the advantages offered by the socialist society for a dependable military protection of socialism. For this reason, those connected with leadership activities must, in connection with each individual decision, pay heed even more thoroughly to economic requirements and expenditures, and they must consider pertinent economic questions in these activities with greater awareness and more intensively. Realization of economic requirements is not merely a temporary, campaign-type task, nor is it a task which has been assigned only for certain spheres of activity such as, for instance, the rear services.

The principle of optimum results and effectiveness, i.e. "achievement of the greatest effect with the least expenditure of human resources and material values in the shortest possible time,"⁹ applies to all leadership levels and to all phases of the leadership cycle. Economical use of vehicles, equipment, money, and time must be made in all phases: in connection with working up and formulating tasks; in calculating and allocating manpower, means, and time; in organizing and carrying out tasks, controls, recapitulation of results; and in working up a decision for the next cycle. Each expenditure must to a greater extent than hitherto be measured against the benefits and the actual increase in fighting strength and combat readiness which our army has derived from it, or which it has derived from it only to an unsatisfactory degree. Each chief, commander, manager, and supervisor, each member of the army and each civilian employee charged with making decisions concerning the use of manpower, means, money, and time or who makes such use himself, is obligated to be economical and efficient in the management of our resources in connection with the fulfillment of his tasks.

In the process of direct organization and execution of military work in the troop formations, units, workshops, and installations, the final decisions concerning planned and ordered use are ultimately made. Here is the moment of truth, here it becomes apparent how effectively the supplied technical equipment and the material and financial means are put to use and exploited.

Military-economic Thinking and Acting Serves the Fulfillment of Our Military Tasks

In what particular areas must military-economic thinking and acting be developed further?

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A primary requirement is effective employment and utilization of armament, combat materiel, equipment, and installations, as well as strict adherence to established norms. This means that, in the course of our day-to-day service, there must be a continuous reevaluation of norms and a determination of revised norms in accordance with the most recently attained levels in the sphere of scientific-technological developments. It is necessary to handle technical equipment expertly and to take care of it and to service it in an exemplary manner. Still occurring damages and losses must be consistently counteracted.

All supervisory personnel must to a greater extent than hitherto see to it that fuel and lubricants, ammunition, energy-producing equipment, provisions, short-lived equipment items, and other consumption materials are handled economically and carefully. This calls for consistently working with precise consumption, inventory, and utilization norms and for carrying through the economization principle.

Economic and effective management includes also in the National People's Army and in the border troops of the German Democratic Republic the need for practicing economy in the use of material and financial resources, although this must be accomplished without the slightest cut in assigned military tasks. In the case of many consumption items, there must be strict observance of both the assigned tasks and of the pertinent norms. If efforts to "economize" are made in the wrong area, this results in a reduction of fighting strength and combat readiness. It is not a matter of limiting the use of means which have been made available, such as ammunition, camouflage materials, the number of kilometers driven, or training equipment. It is much more important that these resources be utilized as effectively as possible in combat training.

Applying the economization principle to those resources and norms which affect the service and living conditions of army personnel and civilian employees (provisioning, clothing, shelter, housing conditions, health care, and means for use in politico-ideological and spiritual-cultural work) means first of all that the resources which have been provided must be put to more effective use and that careful management of the people's property must become everybody's business.

Finally, it is a matter of ensuring a steady increase in the fighting strength and combat readiness in the time available to us for performing our service duties and our work. This requires that we make effective use of our service time, that we increase productivity in the workshops and installations, and that we utilize army personnel and civilian employees in accordance with their knowledge and skills. The sometimes-to-be-encountered view that "work hours put in by soldiers do not cost anything" still opens the way for inefficient use of valuable training and work time. Inefficiently used time has a damaging effect on our efforts to raise the level of our fighting strength and combat readiness.

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All this, of course, requires unceasing and intensive ideological work. Results must be evaluated not only on the basis of time, marks, and grams. An increase in combat readiness is always connected with economical thinking and acting in the military sphere.

FOOTNOTES

1. Compare: "Bericht des Politbueros an die 13. Tagung der SED" /"Politburo Report to the 13th SED Conference". Berlin 1974, p 23.
2. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (Berlin/B-Edition), 11/12 January 1975.
3. Compare Fleissner, W.: "Wealth of New Ideas of Young Innovators Sets New Standards." In: MILITAERTECHNIK, Issue No 2, 1975, p 51.
4. Compare Lenin, V. I.: "WERKE" /"Works", Volume 28. Berlin 1972, p 356.
5. Antipenko, N. A.: "In der Hauptrichtung" /"In the Main Direction". Berlin, 1973, p 20.
6. AUTORENKOLLEKTIV: "Militaerische Theorie und Militaerische Praxis" /"Military Theory and Military Practice". Berlin 1973, p 134.
7. Yepishev, A. A.: "The Communists Are a Powerful Force." In: VOLKSARMEE, Berlin. Documentation No 1, 1975, p 7.
8. Brezhnev, L. I.: "Speech at the 15th Congress of the Komsomol." In: "Auf dem Wege Lenins" /"On Lenin's Course", Volume 1, Berlin 1971, p 399 and following pages.
9. AUTORENKOLLEKTIV: "Militaerische Theorie und Militaerische Praxis." Loc. cit., p 394.

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EMPHASIS PLACED ON DISCIPLINE, ORDER

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 11-14

[By Col Dr G. Kalwert]

/Excerpt/ The struggle for socialist discipline, order, and security is an indissoluble component part of the politico-ideological work of our party and of all state organs. Tasks which are to be solved in the sphere of legal education by the party and state organs have therefore been laid down in great detail by the politburo of the central committee of the SED.

The contents and the methods to be followed in connection with this work have been set up to cover an extended period of time. The strategic orientation for a purposeful socialist education in the sphere of law has been furnished by the Eighth Party Congress of the SED. The following is stated in its resolution. "The party congress considers it to be an important task that observance of socialist law and conscious discipline become solid habits in all spheres of the daily lives of our people. It expects all functionaries of state and industry to adhere to the law consistently and to make the safeguarding of order, discipline, and security a solid component part of the exercise of their leadership functions. Observance of the rights of the citizens in all aspects is a solid principle of our socialist order."¹

This orientation is in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist realization that a mature socialist society can only be created on the basis of a high level of awareness, organization, and discipline and of a strictly guaranteed socialist legal system. For this reason, the education of our citizens to become socialist personalities and the development of their socialist awareness is to an ever increasing extent advancing into the

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focal area of the work of the state organs, of the party organizations, and of other social organizations. In this connection it is primarily a matter of bringing out all forms of socially useful behavior in all members of our socialist society.

The development of the socialist awareness of our citizens in the sphere of law is most significant. It is an important factor for strengthening the socialist state and legal order and thus for the all-round development of our socialist democracy. Education in the sphere of law plays an important role in connection with the solidification of the workers' awareness of our laws. Because only if our laws are known, and if they are consciously applied and realized, will it benefit the social sense of duty of our citizens and of their collectives, and will it promote their conscious cooperation in the solution of social tasks.²

In this context, the SED politburo resolution of 7 May 1974 took note of the fact that, since the Eighth Party Congress of the SED, the leading role of the working class has been further reinforced also in the legal sphere and that the interest of our people in getting information concerning socialist law has grown. From this it follows that efforts to explain our laws and propaganda dealing with our legal system are a necessary component part of the political obligations of each organ and must therefore be considered to be an obligatory task required by the state.

In the resolution, the special responsibility of the party organs in connection with explaining our socialist law is stressed. They must in their politico-ideological education work make greater efforts than heretofore to bring it about that all members and candidates observe the socialist laws in an exemplary manner and that they will lead the way when it comes to ensuring order, discipline, and security. The directorates and basic organizations of the SED are required to intensify party control of the manner in which the functionaries of state and industry and all other management personnel are discharging their responsibility with respect to a consistent realization of socialist law in their daily work.

The development of an awareness of our laws and of conduct which is consciously based on the existing laws constitutes a continuing task of exemplary application of our laws. Socialist awareness of the laws is primarily formed in the workers' collectives, schools, educational institutions, in the social organizations, in the family, and in the housing areas. It is in those areas therefore that education and propaganda concerning our legal system must be regarded as a continuously existing component part of Marxist-Leninist class education of socialist personalities. Socialist law helps to raise the level of our material and cultural life. Legal security is part of the socialist way of life and reinforces the confidence of our citizens in their socialist state.

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Socialist Law and Military Discipline and Order

Important tasks with respect to interpretation of socialist law and to the development of an awareness of socialist law in the National People's Army and among the border troops of the German Democratic Republic have resulted from the politburo decision. For this reason the secretariat of the political main administration has dealt in great detail with the implementation of this decision in the National People's Army and the border troops of the German Democratic Republic. The level of education in the sphere of law was evaluated thoroughly. The commanders, political organs, military justice organs, and directorates of the party and mass organizations are coming to recognize more and more that explaining socialist law and reinforcing awareness of socialist law must constitute an important component part of politico-ideological work, because the development of socialist soldier personalities is thereby influenced to a considerable degree. The socialist legal system, voluntary adherence to socialist law, conscious military discipline and order, and increased combat readiness are inseparably connected. This is being recognized more and more by the members of the National People's Army and of the border troops of the German Democratic Republic, and they increasingly understand its being a prerequisite for the fulfillment of the military main task. This fact finds expression in the systematic cooperation of commanders, political organs, and military justice organs in the execution of educational and propagandistic measures in the legal sphere.

Joint discussions on education in the sphere of law conducted by political administrators or political sections and military justice organs have in many areas already become a regular practice. Most commanders purposefully utilize the knowledge of the military judges and jurors for purposes of explaining socialist law to their army personnel. Particularly those in supervisory positions should be enabled through suitable qualification measures to carry out their educational duties in the sphere of law more adequately.

At the present time, not all possibilities for convincingly explaining socialist law and for reinforcing awareness of our legal system among army personnel are as yet fully utilized. Cooperation between the military commands, the political organs, and the military justice organs is still uneven in the various areas of activity. This also applies to the shaping of programs for explaining socialist law at the educational institutions of the National People's Army and of the border troops of the German Democratic Republic. For an effective propaganda concerning our legal system, it is necessary that cooperation between the publication organs of the National People's Army and the military justice organs also be improved further. Questions of socialist legality and of military discipline and order are today more than ever part of the leadership activity of the commanders, chiefs, and managers. In implementing the politburo decision,

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It is therefore important that the quality of education concerning our laws and the socialist awareness of our legal system be increased at all locations, that the available personnel and resources be coordinated better, and that joint activities be shaped more systematically, with greater continuity, and more accountably.

Proven methods, organizational forms, and management principles should be generalized and continue to be adhered to. The measures to be taken in the sphere of legal education and the efforts to explain socialist law are to focus on the following points:

- observance of the laws and execution of orders and service regulations;
- reinforcement of socialist relations in the socialist collectives;
- carrying through the rights and duties of army personnel, civilian employees, and individuals working for the National People's Army and for the border troops of the German Democratic Republic;
- mobilization of the social forces for purposes of an effective reduction of punishable offenses and violations of discipline;
- raising the level of political vigilance and an aggressive wiping out of ideological diversion by the enemy.

Analysis of the discipline, order, and security existing in each individual area is an important prerequisite for effective education in the sphere of law. Using this as a basis, there must be a systematic application of variously tested forms and methods of politico-ideological work. In this connection, an important part is played by continued socio-scientific education, political training, and the party training year.

In order to achieve a purposeful increase of knowledgeability in the sphere of law on the part of the cadres of the National People's Army and the border troops of the German Democratic Republic, it is necessary that the officer academies, the Wilhelm Pieck Military-Political Academy, and the noncommissioned officer schools pay more attention to education in the sphere of law.

The politico-ideological education work of the political organs and basic organizations of the SED should be aimed at exemplary adherence to the military regulations and rules of law by their members and candidates. Periodically consultations on the existing state of awareness of our laws and of legal education are to be recommended. This has proved to be successful in many basic SED organizations. The military justice organs will actively support the party and mass organization directorates in this endeavor.

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The setting of these tasks by the secretariat of the political main administration has produced manifold measures and initiatives for implementing the politburo decision in the National People's Army and the border troops of the German Democratic Republic. On almost all command levels, the decision of the politburo of the SED central committee was the subject of joint consultations by commanders, chiefs, managers, and political organs as well as the military justice organs. In the individual areas, concrete measures for achieving more effective education in the sphere of law were ordered to be taken. At membership meetings, many basic organizations of the party evaluate the existing state of military discipline and order and critically discuss law violations. In accordance with the tasks set by the politburo decision, the scope of continued socio-scientific education and of the program for explaining our legal system at the educational institutions of the National People's Army and of the border troops of the German Democratic Republic was increased. The publication organs of the National People's Army have accorded significant press space to questions of law clarification; the military justice organs have intensified their efforts of legal education and propaganda. Education in the sphere of law must, however, not be something which is in the nature of a campaign. Reinforcement and development of awareness of the laws is a continuing task and a solid component part of politico-ideological education work. The now and then still prevalent view that education in the sphere of law is primarily a task of the military justice organs must therefore be overcome. It is the commanders, chiefs, managers, and the party organizations who are primarily responsible for the reinforcement and development of awareness of our legal system on the part of the members of our army. The military justice organs provide support for guidance in the sphere of legal education with their specific means and methods and with their experience.

In the interest of fulfillment of the main military task it is necessary to carry out with great initiative and on a high quality and effectiveness level the tasks arising from the politburo decision for the National People's Army and for the border troops of the German Democratic Republic, and to make a contribution to the further strengthening of the socialist state and legal system of the German Democratic Republic.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Decision of the Eighth Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Concerning the Central Committee Report." In: "Dokumente des VII. Parteitages der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands" / "Documents of the 8th Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany"/. Berlin 1971, p 31.
2. See Honecker, E.: "Die Vorbereitung und Durchfuehrung der Wahlen der Volkskammer und zu den Bezirkstagen" / "Preparations for and Holding of the People's Chamber and Bezirk Assembly Elections"/. Berlin 1971, p 43.

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FORMATION OF HABITS SEEN AIDING MILITARY CONDUCT

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 36-41

[By Col Dr D. -R, Riecke and Lt Col K. Vollmer of the Wilhelm Pieck
Military-Political Academy]

/Text/ When exemplary members of our army are asked why they are carrying out their military duties in an exact and prescribed manner, they give the most diverse answers, such as: "I am doing it because it is demanded of me and, furthermore, because I am used to doing things in this manner," or "I am not really all that conscious of it, because I am accustomed to doing things this way," and other such answers.

Similar answers are frequently received, however, when army personnel are asked why they have violated service regulations. They say: "It just happened," or "I just got use to doing it." Such and similar statements give expression to the fact that actions can to a considerable extent be carried out as a habit, automatically as it were, and relatively steadily.

One considers one's own or collective action as being a matter of course, and one no longer gives oneself any mental accounting of it. This is a good thing if positive habits of army personnel are involved. That which has already become a habit for army personnel and collectives, that which has already become an integral part of them, does not need to be continually thought through and organized anew. Makarenko pointed out this state of things when he made the following statement: "At times we make improper use of the term 'conscious.' Our conduct must be the conscious conduct of a person of the class-less society, but that does not mean that we must always call upon our consciousness in connection with our conduct. This would involve too costly a burden for our consciousness."¹

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What Do We Mean By "Habits?"

We designate as habits those thinking and conduct processes which must not always be guided anew by our consciousness, and which to a considerable extent take place automatically. Because they have been practiced and have passed the test in diverse situations, one gets used to certain ways of thinking and acting, and one consistently conducts oneself in this manner. Similar to skills, habits are relatively automated component parts of conscious activity. In this respect, habits and skills have certain things in common.

In contrast to skills, however, habits do not require an automatic thought and action process only. Habits are delimited from skills for the particular reason that there is at the root of them the need to think and act in the same manner over and over again. Rubinstein characterized this difference between skills and habits as follows: "Habit, however, includes the need to carry out a certain action."²

Thus, in contrast to skills, habits have a pronounced need character, whereby they will always be subject to politico-moral valuation. Since they are characterized by a need factor, habits influence and regulate thinking and feeling to a considerable extent and, as a matter of fact, all the actions and conduct of soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers.

If a thorough and exemplary fulfillment of their political and military duties has become a habit for army personnel, then this at the same time also indicates the development of certain personality properties. "Sow habits and you will harvest character," says a proverb.³

Practical experience has shown that habits and the automatic ways of thinking and acting inherent therein play a considerable part on the battle field. They are well-nigh vitally important, for they guard the soldier against superfluous burdens and unnecessary diversion, and they thereby make it possible for him to devote his full concentration to his tasks in combat and thus to fight victoriously. Thus, for instance, a soldier who is accustomed to displaying correct behavior in combat does not have to spend a lot of time for deliberation as to how he is to proceed, how he must take advantage of the terrain, and how he must make effective use of his weapons. Rather, he is able to direct all his attention to the battle for purposes of destroying the enemy.

In contrast to this, however, a soldier's inhibitory habits, such as mechanical thinking and acting, lack of discipline, and irresponsibility can have an unfavorable effect on his preparations for battle and on his actions in combat. Such inhibitory habits can lead to improper conduct in combat and can result in needlessly spilt blood and in defeats.

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In their day-to-day educational work, superior officers have the primary task to develop positive, useful habits and to create those conditions which will make it possible for such habits to develop and to become reinforced. In so doing they must at the same time overcome inhibitory and negative habits.

Which Habits Must Be Developed?

In answering this question, let us first of all and as a matter of principle proceed from the fact that the direction to be followed in connection with the habits which are to be developed in the members of our army and in the collectives is prescribed by the basic documents of our party, state, and armed forces guidance organs. These include, above all, those ways of thinking and acting which are particularly important for the fulfillment of the military class mission, for combat readiness, and for the development of the fighting strength of the military collectives. Thus, the Ninth Conference of Delegates calls for "the development of such soldierly qualities as an aggressive spirit, steadfastness, courage, readiness to serve, self-control, perseverance, and an unshakeable will to victory,"⁴ and it demands that "those ways of thinking and acting be developed which the members of our army require for emerging victorious in battle."⁵

Such ways of thinking and acting are:

- considering an order given by one's superior to be a mandate from the workers' class;
- trusting one's superior and carrying out each order without contradiction;
- regarding one's superior officer or subordinate as a class comrade;
- always setting an example for others;
- thinking tasks through scrupulously and bringing them to a successful conclusion, as well as overcoming difficulties arising in connection therewith; and not permitting any training shortcuts.

Among other things, the development of these and other (important and less important) ways of thinking and acting is a process of consciousness development which must be purposefully carried out and shaped. Only such a process will produce those habits for which we are striving, "that is, habits which make us act properly not because we sat down and thought about them, but because we are used to acting in such a way, and can not act differently."⁶

Which Conditions Are Important For the Development of Habits?

The development of habits depends on many conditions. As a rule, it never depends on just one. In the following we will show some conditions

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which determine the development of habits to a considerable extent. They do not nearly include all of them.

Conformity of the to-be-developed ways of thinking and acting with the needs and interests of a particular member of the army is one of the most important conditions. Important in this connection is the phenomenon, which surely is known to everyone, that any thinking and acting which corresponds to one's own needs and interests will become a habit more quickly than any thinking and acting which runs counter to one's own needs and interests. He who feels the need always to give his best will always fight for what is best. But he who does not feel such a need, will make it a habit to "get it over with." It is therefore necessary to use existent needs and interests as points of contact--to the extent that they are suitable for the development and reinforcement of habits--and, if called for, to remove unsuitable needs and interests and possibly to develop new ones to take their place, in order to thereby help along the creation of habits which are politically well-founded and which are solid from a military point of view.

It should be noted that the entire previous development of a member of the armed forces, his awareness, and among other things also his needs and interests have the effect of a filter when he makes his assessment of new requirements. From the many bits of information at his disposal, a member of the army will select, as it were, those which coincide with his point of view and will then act accordingly. He will, for the time being, reject other information because it is counter to his point of view.

Habits are quite dependent on the system of values and norms existing in a collective and, actually, in the long run development of only those habits is possible which are suitable for the collective and which are considered by the collective to be right.

As a consequence, a member of the armed forces will in most cases develop those habits of which he knows and which he feels that they are meeting with the approval of the collective in which he lives. On the other hand, the collective in each case sees to it that an individual will develop habits which serve the collective and, if necessary, calls him to account. Consequences resulting from such procedure, for example, are that the education of the individual is always tied to his education in the collective and that the system of collective values and norms must be shaped in such a manner that socialist habits are bound to be developed and that bourgeois habits are overcome, or not permitted.

Habits are not formed "over night." Ways of thinking and acting become habits if, after having repeatedly practiced them, it has become a need for a member of the armed forces to act and think in a certain way and, if in so doing, he does not first take himself to account with respect to

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his thought process or the course of his action. Practicing ways of thinking and acting which are to become habits calls for over and over again placing army personnel patiently and perseveringly in situations in which they must act in accordance with the desired habit. Disciplined acting becomes a habit through acting in a disciplined manner. Acting creatively and with a good measure of initiative becomes a habit for those members of the army of whom this is required daily and who are, of course, given the appropriate conditions for accomplishing this.

It is also necessary in this connection to impart to army personnel the requirements, principles, and norms which are at the base of positive habits, that they understand them properly, and that they become a significant personal experience for them. Once this has been achieved, then that which they have recognized as being necessary and proper must be practiced with the utmost consistency and carried through at all events, so that it can become a positive thinking and acting habit.

The process of such practicing is therefore nothing else but a systematic perfecting of certain ways of thinking and acting. A member of the armed forces participates in this process with his whole being. Such practice must therefore not be understood to be simple mechanical repetition, and it must be engaged in with such an understanding.

Of course, it is also possible that there will be occasional failures in connection with the forming of habits. Failures, or giving up prematurely, make it difficult for a habit to come into being and may even prevent its coming into existence. One can note indications of a premature giving up when hearing such remarks as "this is too strenuous," or "this takes too long for my liking," and so forth. In order to accomplish that, through practice, the formation of the positive habits which had been planned is really being promoted, the following points, among others, should be kept in mind:

--making army personnel aware of the need for such practicing and of the objectives to be attained through it;

--proper consistence, continuity, and regularity;

--continual and comprehensive controls, critical evaluation by supervisory personnel and by the collective, and proper assistance and guidance during the course of the practicing.

The example set by supervisory personnel and by the party and FDJ /Free German Youth/ functionaries plays an extraordinarily important role in connection with the formation of habits. According to findings in the sphere of developmental psychology, young people, and thus also young members of our army, have a distinct desire to let themselves be guided

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by examples and ideals. The tendency to imitate and to emulate connected with this must be purposefully utilized for shaping positive habits.

In this context, the Ninth Delegates Conference called attention to the following: "In order to achieve further progress in the areas of discipline and order we expect of all military superior officers that they themselves will always set an example in military life and that they personify deeply rooted revolutionary discipline in their thinking and acting."⁷

If, for instance, a member of the army sees that the superior officers and functionaries always take regulations and orders seriously and carry them out in an exemplary manner, that they are consistent in requiring their subordinates to carry them out, and are creating the conditions necessary for living in accordance with the rules, then this will help to develop the habits of carrying out orders and observing regulations in an exemplary manner.

Formation of positive habits is unthinkable without making high demands on members of our army. With the making of a certain demand, the process of thinking and acting on the part of army personnel is not only started off and steered into a direction which is in accordance with the given orders and service regulations but, in addition, the desired habits are formed and reinforced through repeated fulfillment of the demand. It is extremely important particularly in the case of young army personnel that, with due consideration of their personalities, demands be made on them from the very first hour of their military service. Only in this manner will they get used without great difficulty to the military service conditions which, for them, are something new. If this is not done, one should not be surprised if, in the case of some army personnel, habits will evolve which are counter to exemplary military duty performance and which it will then be difficult to overcome. In actual practice it is apparent again and again that educating is easier than re-educating!

When implementing the requirement for the formation of positive habits, one should, among other things, pay attention to seeing to it that reasons are given for the need to make high demands and that an awareness of them is developed, so that they will then be accepted and supported; that one always uses as a point of departure the requirements of modern combat and that the level of development of the army personnel concerned is taken into consideration to the greatest possible extent; that the demands which are being made are not only understood by the army personnel concerned, but that they consider them to be proper and will carry them out unquestioningly; and that finally, demands are made on a continuing basis and raised systematically, and that they are aimed at attainment of the optimum performance level by the army personnel concerned.

A life style in line with socialism under the severe conditions of military life is to an increasing extent becoming for us a fundamental prerequisite

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for developing those creative initiatives which today are necessary for the fulfillment of the military main task."⁸

At the same time, the socialist life style and the service and living conditions must never be regarded as a one-sided material and organizational-technical matter. They are, above all, also a matter of the relations and the climate existing in a collective as well as the prevailing spiritual-cultural conditions, and they are thus a continuous socialist leadership concern. If, for instance, one establishes order which is strict and in accordance with the applicable regulations and which is maintained continuously from day to day, then the end result will surely be that many elements of the military activity of army personnel will be handled with ever greater ease and more in the nature of a habit. The habit of having confidence in the commander and in his orders is developed wherever pertinent experiences can be gathered and occurrences witnessed.

What Conclusions Can Be Drawn For the Development of Habits?

Supervisory personnel and the party and FDJ organizations develop in their politico-ideological work the necessary knowledge of and insight into the norms of socialist thinking and acting as laid down in the basic documents and service regulations. Army personnel learn to comprehend why they must act in a certain way and not in any other way. For army personnel can develop positive habits quickly and effectively only if they have the necessary pertinent knowledge and understanding, i.e., if they have awareness. This purposeful and continuous development of socialist habits under military conditions must begin with the inception of military service. Whatever is accomplished at that juncture, will be lasting; whatever is neglected at that juncture will be difficult to make up.

Through systematic practice of required socialist-type thinking and acting in the sphere of political and military activities, the ways of thinking and acting will be so reinforced that they will ultimately become automatic and that in this connection there develops the need for doing things in a certain way over and over again, and in no other way. This calls for well-thought-out demands to be made on the young soldiers by way of service regulations and by way of making sure that all superior officers and functionaries proceed in a uniform manner in implementing them. This, among other things, involves a thorough knowledge of all subordinates and, based on this, various different ways of proceeding.

Adherence to the dialectics of personality and collective development ensures utilization of the educational potentialities of the military collective for the formation of positive habits. Systematic development of socialist collective views in the unit, solidification of socialist relations in the collective, and between the collective and superior officers, inclusion of the collective in the solution of tasks and in the education of its members, and many other factors are conditions which promote the development of socialist habits.

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In short: "Favorable conditions for an open, partisan atmosphere exist wherever commanders, political organs, and party organizations attend to the development of socialist relations between army personnel and within the collectives, and wherever due attention is paid to a steady improvement of the service and living conditions of army personnel. It is there that our argumentation in political discussions falls on fertile ground, it is there that activities and conscious acting develop, and it is there that the soldiers will carry out their difficult duties gladly and enthusiastically."⁹

FOOTNOTES

1. Makarenko, A. S.: "Werke" ["Works"], Vol 5, Berlin 1964, p 453.
2. Rubinstein, S. L.: "Grundlagen der Allgemeinen Psychologie" ["Fundamentals of General Psychology"]. Berlin 1962, p 685.
3. Quoted from Petrovski, A. W.: "Allgemeine Psychologie" ["General Psychology"]. Berlin 1975, p 179.
4. From the report of the secretariat of the NVA political main administration to the Ninth Delegates Conference of the SED party organizations in the National People's Army and the GDR border troops. Speaker: Comrade Admiral Waldemar Verner. In: PARTEIARBEITER, Berlin. Special Ninth Delegates Conference issue, 1 February 1974, p 33.
5. Ibidem.
6. Makarenko, A. S.: Loc. cit., p 463.
7. From the report....Loc. cit., p 43.
8. Ibidem, p 43.
9. From the concluding remarks by Comrade Willi Stoph, member of the politburo of the SED central committee and chairman of the GDR council of state. In: PARTEIARBEITER, Berlin. Special Ninth Delegates Conference issue, 1 February 1974, p 94 and following pages.

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BASIC IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTIONS OUTLINED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 42-48

[By Lt Col Dr A. Bendrat, political scientist]

/Excerpts/ Like ideological work as a whole, political training in the armed forces aims at fulfilling the main military task. Its aims are directed unequivocally at insuring high fighting capacity and combat readiness, at the action and behavior of members of the army.

What components of military behavior are at stake? What is at stake is an ideologically, politically and morally founded behavior of socialist soldiers, such as:

--unconditional execution of orders, which in the socialist army means behavior deriving from conscious, that is, politically understood and personally accepted, subordination to the will of the superior as that of a class comrade;

--iron military discipline, which in the socialist army means behavior deriving from the soldier's moral attitude, an attitude he has adopted as a member of the working class, following the example of its best revolutionary fighters and, above all, the model of the Soviet Army;

--struggle for the best possible training results, which in the socialist army means behavior supported by personal responsibility for the protection of socialism, which the soldier has learned and acknowledged to be the cause that is most just and most worth defending.

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We could go on in the same vein. To base the whole behavior of the soldier or noncommissioned officer and all his concrete manifestations in military service on a class-conscious personal decision, taken voluntarily out of ideological conviction--that is the responsibility of ideological work in the armed forces and is its ultimate objective, and thus also the ultimate objective of political training.

Thus a comprehensive and rather complicated educational and training task presents itself, a task which by no means can be solved instantly and from one day to the next. All prerequisites--for example the so-called "preliminary phases" of action and behavior with the main military task in view and, above all, knowledge and know-how--are means toward the end, means from which the development of actual behavior proceeds. The best knowledge and know-how remains socially useless unless it results in required action.

Without the mentioned prerequisites, then--especially without knowledge and know-how and class-related motivation--a class-conscious behavior is unthinkable.

Knowledge and Political Training

It goes without saying that the quality of political training cannot be measured solely by taught and acquired knowledge. It is a question of teaching this knowledge in such a way as to affect as much as possible the action as well as the thinking of army members. But what is decisive is the realization that the content of political training, consisting of fundamental questions of Marxist-Leninist ideology, plays the decisive role.

The teaching of Marxist-Leninist theory--that is, work with the subject matter of political training--is gaining increasing importance. The reasons for this are, among other things:

First, in building socialism/communism, the part played by conscious action of our people increases, and thus the need increases for acquiring more and more knowledge especially in the field of social science.

Second, our workers' and especially our youth's general and specialized education, their ideological knowledge and experience, their whole intellectual and cultural level increase constantly. On this basis the self-confidence and self-assurance of the individual and the collective are consolidated, and their demands increase for all types of education, especially for ideological, political and moral education.

Third, the adversary, primarily in the form of social democratic theories of social science, is working with sophisticated methods. To thwart these

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and to unmask their demagogical anticommunist nature requires firm and applicable knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and of the policy of our party.

Fourth, the further development of the military, modernization of the socialist armed forces and the increasing share of technology and theory demands a higher degree of ideological, political and moral as well as intellectual education of members of the armed forces in all branches of combat training.

In the future, among the many components which determine instruction in political training and are directed toward high educational effectiveness, knowledge, lasting and concretely applicable knowledge, will further gain in importance as the basis and guideline of all ideological work and all educational processes.

What determines the scope of the content of political training, and thus of the knowledge which trainees are to be taught?

If we look over the programs, we are faced with a situation of partly great differences in topics and, at the same time, of great differences in structure as far as subject matter is concerned.

The programs and educational materials centrally predetermine subject matter, which is based on what our society has already achieved in the field of educating the young generation.

Our training group leaders need to know more about this and must show a greater personal interest in finding out at what level our 14 to 18-year-old youths these days acquire a Marxist-Leninist outlook in the general polytechnical or expanded high school and in their professional training, what they already know and what demands they make. No one should allow himself to be guided by the demeanor of one trainee or another, for this has led to surprises in many cases.

Sociological findings and analyses show unequivocally, and one's own experience confirms, that the ideological education of our youth is progressing faster than many a person supposes on the basis of dubious external criteria (haircut, interest in music and so forth).

Of course, it is to be assumed that the average general and ideological educational level differs from group to group. Preliminary training and training group leaders must assess in a responsible manner what knowledge of the topic concerned must be newly acquired or consolidated by the training group and what parts can be skipped entirely under certain circumstances.

The time available to us demands that we base political training on certain prerequisites. The objective of political training in the NVA makes it

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clear that we cannot and do not wish to cover everything. The selection of the subject matter of political training is determined by the task of teaching whatever is needed by the army members as military class fighters. This is true of the program as a whole and of each topic. The soldier or noncommissioned officer, then, shall absorb the training program content not in a quantitative way or from the point of view of completeness, but in accordance with ideological-educational points of emphasis and guidelines which mark the development of fundamental convictions.

It is a Question of Fundamental Ideological Convictions

What are the fundamental convictions of an NVA soldier?

In accordance with party decisions and guiding documents in the NVA, it is a question of developing or unrelentingly deepening and stabilizing the following fundamental convictions:¹

First: Our times are marked by the worldwide offensive of socialism, by historic achievements and irresistible progress of socialism/communism. The future belongs only to this social system. There is only one scientific, and thus true, theory of the development of human society: Marxism-Leninism, the ideology of the working class. Lenin's party has accomplished path-finding feats of historic significance. The workers party of my country is tied to it in the closest way possible. The Socialist Unity Party of Germany is part of the millions-strong guard of communist and workers parties of all continents. Under the leadership of this party, in firm alliance with the CPSU, the socialist GDR has grown and strengthened in a historically short period and despite great difficulties. Through the military policy of the SED, clear in purpose and firm in principle, the NVA has developed into a modern socialist army at the side of the Soviet brothers-in-arms and all other allied armed forces.

The party is the most consistent and dependable advocate of the workers' interests and the well-being of all working people. This is why this party has my confidence. Whether as a communist or as a young socialist, I consider myself a party soldier. Its will is my will, its demands are my command.

Second: At the side of the Soviet Army and of the other armed forces of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty, the National People's Army is an instrument of the working class, of the socialist German Democratic Republic and our socialist community of states gathered firmly around the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and our socialist alliance play a decisive role in the worldwide revolutionary process. To contribute to making it possible for our socialist family of peoples and, within it, our German Democratic Republic to develop undisturbed and powerfully is a vital task in the class struggle. In the great collective of the builders of socialism, it is

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my task as a soldier or noncommissioned officer, in the spirit of socialist internationalism and patriotism, to fight in close comradeship-in-arms with the Soviet Army and the other fraternal armies for the best possible contribution to the military strengthening of socialism/communism. Only thus can I prove my love for my socialist mother country. Only thus can I prove that I am serious about the cause of the working class, of my people, of socialism and of my own future. Conscious and unconditional execution of orders, iron military discipline, struggle for the highest yields in fighting capacity and combat readiness--these I must regard as my main personal tasks in the class struggle of our times.

Third: As long as one has not yet succeeded in compelling the imperialist powers to general and complete disarmament, as long as the enemies of socialism have military weapons at their disposal and maintain armies, so long must socialism remain on guard, and so long must its military superiority be insured and developed. The superiority of the socialist armies, its weapons and technological means of combat, its organization and discipline does not arise of its own accord; it depends also on my personal effort, my desire to perform and the abilities of each and every collective.

Along with my collective, I want to do everything in my power to contribute daily to the military superiority of socialism. I constantly want to strive to expand my political and military knowledge and abilities. I want to be among those who think for themselves and who personally contribute to the victory of the unit in the socialist competition, to the rule of socialist relationships in the collective, to everyone fulfilling his tasks exactly and with initiative.

Fourth: All phenomena of the life of society of our times in the last analysis can be traced back to the operation and the interests of two classes and social systems which are contrary and mutually exclusive--the working class and the capitalist class, socialism and imperialism. In any ideological, political or moral decision, as a soldier of the NVA I must therefore always proceed from the interests of my class, which I serve, of my socialist state and its allies. Anyone who attacks, endangers or threatens to endanger socialism--in whatever guise he appears, to whatever class he belongs, in whosoever behalf he pretends to act--is a witting or unwitting, direct or indirect advocate of the interests of imperialism, an enemy of socialism and thus my personal enemy. Proceeding from this realization and position, I must prove my party attitude in fighting offensively against all shades of bourgeois ideology and against the enemies of socialism.

The more persistently and intensively I act, jointly with the comrades of my unit, in order to strengthen socialism militarily, the better we are prepared for a possible war, the more hopeless, it becomes for the imperialist class adversaries to instigate a military confrontation. Should it

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nevertheless come to war, I will fight with every means at my disposal for the destruction of the enemy, for the military victory of socialism.

This enumeration of four fundamental convictions, made for purposes of instruction, is not to be misinterpreted as meaning that consciousness is divided into four parts, as it were, with each part, through a set store of knowledge, governing certain feelings, interests and needs. Though this enumeration makes it clearer what the points of emphasis in education are, the fundamental convictions in fact develop as a complex of fundamental realizations, feelings, motives, abilities and ways of behavior which are closely intertwined, derive from one another and are interdependent.

Class-conscious action and behavior for the best possible fulfillment of the main military task is the central aim of all guidance, training and ideological work in the NVA. It is also the central aim of political training. We ask more of army members than simply to fulfill their duties, for in combat victory is forged not through a good average but through the greatest physical and psychological effort; therefore the party demands, and we strive for, such action and behavior as proceeds from firm fundamental ideological convictions.

Is it possible to speak of criteria for this in conditions of peace? It is. What are the most important requirements concerning the attitude and actions of class-conscious soldiers which are to be regarded as decisive for achieving the educational objective?

The requirement of conscious military action: The fact that the soldier or noncommissioned officer knows his military task, acknowledges it and puts it into effect with a sense of purpose is not the sole indication of his acting consciously. True, it is of elementary importance, for successful actions would hardly be possible otherwise.

A member of the NVA acts consciously if he comprehends the military task from the political point of view, if he understands its fulfillment as a political-moral norm, if he identifies with this task and fulfills it under all conditions, with the greatest concentration of effort and with iron discipline. Once the military task becomes the soldier's political-moral norm, which he voluntarily imposes on himself out of conviction, once it becomes a matter of moral obligation, a matter of personal honor, to fulfill the task in the best possible way, one can speak of conscious activity.

The requirement of creative military activity, rich in initiative: Our army member has learned to be creative and to exercise initiative if his fundamental ideological convictions lead to activities, coupled with knowledge and know-how, aimed at accomplishing more, quantitatively and qualitatively, than the minimum through personal thinking and personal

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concrete participation. We have attained creative military activity, rich in initiative, if there is striving for a rational solution of tasks, for greatest effectiveness, in the interest of one's own development and that of the collective, but above all in the interest of the best possible fulfillment of duties.

The requirement of independent military activity: Only when the soldier or noncommissioned officer is in a position to put acquired knowledge, experience and abilities into practice, with neither superior nor other comrades having to intervene by encouraging him or making severe demands on him--only then is the decisive prerequisite established for meeting the demands of life in general and the conditions of modern combat in particular. How important in this connection are independent class-determined decisions and actions under complicated combat conditions! Independently to continue one's ideological and military education, to inform oneself politically and to stand one's ground in difficult political or military situations--these are valuable and extremely important criteria of behavior of a socialist soldier's personality.

The requirement of sociopolitical activity: One cannot talk of consolidated fundamental ideological convictions until there is a coupling of service and social activity. Exemplary accomplishments in combat training and in political training, on the one hand, and indifference and inactivity regarding social obligations, on the other hand, are irreconcilable as far as the socialist soldier is concerned. This is, of course, also true the other way round. To expend a great deal of zeal and strength in behalf of social activities and to come up with definitely useful contributions to discussions at gatherings, but not to be up to par in military service is even more harmful from the educational point of view, because then the supposed ideological conviction is not demonstrated in the principal field of a soldier's fulfillment of duty, and not in the activity which is socially the most important.

Sociopolitical activity means, among other things, to integrate consciously and actively in the collective and to help form the socialist relationships in the unit.

But it also means active participation in the life of the fighting collective and of the FDJ organization; it means striving for intellectual education and great accomplishments in combat training, in discipline and order, in the whole military life.

Unity of service and sociopolitical activity is thus an important component of the educational objective of ideological work, including especially political training.

The requirement of exemplary, class-conscious, overall behavior: Socialist education and ideological work are directed toward omnilateral development

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of the personality, with lasting and stable fundamental ideological convictions. We reach this objective when the soldier or noncommissioned officer of the NVA is guided by class-consciousness and acts in accordance with the norms of socialist morality in every situation, on duty and off duty, toward his superior and his comrades in his unit, toward his family, his wife or his best friend, and when making personal decisions. We educate our socialist soldiers in accordance with this principle: Everyone must have a firm class point of view and must not divide it, say, into a "service consciousness" and an "everyday consciousness." This is the only way to understand the unity of feeling, thinking, ability and action. This unity is an important criterion of educational results in political training.

Summing up the educational requirements of the objective of political training, we can say: In political training the ideological, political, moral and intellectual bases are to be taught in such a way that the soldiers and noncommissioned officers understand, acknowledge, desire, can meet and do meet the requirements regarding the behavior and action of a socialist fighter's personality which derive from Marxist-Leninist ideology and from the policy of the party.

FOOTNOTE

1. Comrade Admiral Waldemar Verner. In PARTEIARBEITER (Berlin), Special Issue I, 1974, p 53.

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COMMENTARY PROVIDED ON WESTERN CRITICS OF DETENTE

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 70-71

[Commentary by P.H.]

/Text/ For some time, covert and overt attacks against further progress of detente have markedly increased. Those forces which, if not to undo, would like at least to arrest the positive changes in international relations are stirring in greater strength. Certain Western press organs go so far as to announce that detente has proved "illusory," that it is "coming to an end."

There is nothing new in this: the process of detente has active and involuntary participants, detached observers and overt opponents. We have therefore never imagined the road to detente to be smooth. On the contrary, it has been easier to predict frontal attacks against detente than the weather of the coming day. Only as a result of new historical conditions, of a changed balance of strength, has imperialism been forced to go along and take steps to reshape international relations in terms of peaceful coexistence--steps which contradict its nature, its striving for expansion and aggression. To this constraint, the various factions of the bourgeoisie react in very different ways. Some grasp the realities of our times earlier than others and are inclined to take these realities into account. Others, primarily the inciters in NATO and in the military-industrial complex, have always been bitter enemies of detente and have remained so to this day. These are the forces which have put their stake on the armament business, on cold war and confrontation, and whose ideas and activities embody in the clearest and grossest way the unchanged aim of imperialism, that is, the weakening and, in the end, the elimination of socialism.

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These are the forces which still have not given up hope of one day again achieving military superiority over socialism and, with this illusory aim in view, are stepping up the armament race. Finally, these are the forces which speculate that by increasing international tensions and stirring up existing centers of conflict they will be able to slough over the exacerbating internal crises of the imperialist system. At no time have we closed our eyes to the fact that there are still dangerous negative trends in the world, trends which are even increasing in a number of countries. Thus, the armament race is proceeding unabated in the countries of NATO--in fact, partly even increasing in strength. Qualitative improvement of weapons has reached unprecedented scope. Attempts to misrepresent and discredit the principles of peaceful coexistence are multiplying. Psychological warfare against the socialist countries, anti-Soviet and anti-communist campaigns--one could go on till one reached the antidetente policy of the Maoists, whose actions aim more and more openly at the continuing and increasing of tensions.

Nor can it be overlooked that these negative trends are making all sorts of negotiations between socialist and imperialist countries more difficult. Most recent examples are the attempts of aggressive circles in the United States to impose discriminatory trade conditions on the Soviet Union, or the destructive attitude of the NATO countries participating in the Vienna negotiations on reducing armed forces and armaments in central Europe. All this does harm to the course of detente for which, as is known, the governments of the NATO countries have declared themselves.

By their nature, the countries of socialism have the greatest interest in peace and detente. They will consistently continue to pursue their policy outlined in the peace program of the 24th Party Congress of the CPSU, a policy which rests on firm and durable foundations. This policy proceeds from the fact that the positive changes in international relations are nothing temporary or transitory but are caused by objective factors. In the end, it is not the good will or the malevolence of one politician or the other which decides the fate of the process of detente but the relationship of the class forces in the world, in the first place the power of the community of socialist states. We won't give the opponents of detente the slightest chance to change this balance of strength back in their favor. At no time do we forget "that the forces of aggression have not yet been rendered harmless and that the danger of war has not yet been averted. It is and remains a hard reality of our times."

FOOTNOTE

1. Grechko, A. A.. In VOLKSARMEE, Berlin, 1 Feb 1975, p 3.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON PROBLEMS OF MODERN WAR

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 77-79

[Review by Col Dr G. Kiessling of the book "The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Modern War," authors' collective, East Berlin, Military Publishing House of the GDR, 1974]

/Text/ With the issue of the book "Das Philosophische Erbe W. I. Lenins und Probleme des Modernen Kriegs" /The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Modern War/ the Militaerverlag /Military Publishing House/ of the German Democratic Republic continues the sound tradition of familiarizing with the most recent findings and analyses of Soviet scientists those people in the GDR who are interested in ideological and methodological problems of military theory and practice, of socialist military policy and socialist military education.

As the publishers of the book emphasize in the foreword, the present times pose quite a few new and complicated military philosophical problems which must be solved, on the basis of V. I. Lenin's philosophical heritage. For this reason the authors have set themselves the task, proceeding from the wealth of Lenin's philosophical ideas and ideas of military theory "to consider...some philosophical problems of war and peace as well as of the building up of the armed forces." In their view, an important concern is above all "creatively to apply the principles of scientific methodology, of the Leninist analysis of topical problems of modern war and of the building up of armed forces and to show what demands the Leninist style of work makes of one's own person and others in military science research." The posing of these questions is of interest and relevance not only for a small group of specialists but for a large circle of people. The questions covered in the 16 chapters of the book may be divided into three groups. The main contents of the first group are ideologically relevant problems

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of war, above all from methodological points of view. The authors analyze and describe the main features of the fundamental methodological significance of Lenin's concept of the relation between an era and war and apply this concept to our era of transition from capitalism to socialism, especially to the problem of war and peace in our time. They cover the significance of the Leninist principles of sociological analysis of wars for research into the wars of the present era and comprehensively discuss the misrepresentation of the Leninist concept of the essence and nature of war by imperialist, opportunist and revisionist ideologists.

Proceeding from Lenin's definition of the essence of the era of transition from capitalism to socialism, they demonstrate convincingly that "imperialism, whose general crisis is deepening further,...(continues to be) a source of constant threat to peace and social progress" and show that collective armed protection of socialism against any plots of imperialism is objectively necessary and conforming to laws. The authors emphasize the thoroughly just and humanistic nature of the collective defense of existing socialism, stating: "Omnilateral perfection of the economic and military might of the community of socialist peoples and states, the collective protection of their revolutionary achievements, is an example of highest internationalist fulfillment of duty vis-a-vis the present and future generations; for the combined and superior power of the socialist community of states is a bulwark and basis of socialist world revolution, a reliable earnest and genuine guarantee of the triumph of socialism and communism in the entire world."

Of great interest for socialist military science and other individual disciplines, as well as for socialist military policy and military education, is the treatment of the topic "the Essence of War" and of the classification of wars, as well as the pertinent ideological-theoretical discussion in this context. Here, too, the authors are primarily concerned with developing and applying methodological points of view. Thus, the Leninist definition of war is used to prove that, why, and how the dialectic of the general, particular and specific is to be observed in using the topic "the Essence of War." As an important contribution by V. I. Lenin to the methodology of the socialist analysis of wars, the authors point up his introduction of the terms of the class, species and type of wars, which "made possible an exact classification of wars." As classes of wars, the authors identify progressive (just) and reactionary (unjust) wars, which in turn may be subdivided into species of wars; as a "type of war" they identify the concept of war "as an act of bilateral armed struggle," while "the classification of wars" is made "according to the main contradictions which are to be resolved through them." This concept of the type of war is clearly a problem which requires further scientific discussion. In a certain respect, this becomes apparent already in the book under review, for instance, when at one point, among others, the "war between the socialist and the imperialist coalition of states" and at another point,

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"wars for the defense of the socialist fatherland" and "imperialist wars" are similarly identified as types of war, despite the fact that in the two instances not unified but different classification criteria are used. It might also be worth noting that other Soviet authors identify just wars and unjust wars as "principal types of war."¹

The reviewer understands by types of war classes of just wars and classes of unjust wars of a certain historical era and has expounded this concept in several publications.²

In a second group of problems, the questions of the building up of the Soviet armed forces and the development of Soviet military science are discussed. The authors trace the essence of the Leninist concept of the building up of the socialist army and the objective laws on which its development are based. On the basis of the military philosophical heritage of V. I. Lenin, the problem of the laws of development of the socialist armed forces has been researched in the Soviet Union for a long time. For most readers of the book in the GDR, this set of questions is probably new and will therefore attract special attention. Furthermore, the authors cover the contribution made by V. I. Lenin to the beginning and development of Soviet military science and make it apparent that V. I. Lenin's scientific methodology is of great significance for the solutions of problems of the art of war in our days as well as for discussing the methodological bases of bourgeois military theory. The treatment at a high theoretical level of the methodological bases of scientific probability and scientific creativity in military science is very informative and useful. Some chapters in this group of problems are devoted to the methodology of research into the elements of military power of the socialist state as well as of the material and intellectual prerequisites of high combat readiness of the socialist armed forces. Of great topical interest is also the basic critique, founded on Lenin's ideas, of bourgeois militarism.

The main contents of the third group of problems consists of questions of party political work with the troops. In the center of attention--again on the basis of V. I. Lenin's ideas--are substantive and methodological problems of moral-political and psychological preparation of the troops for armed struggle, with the demands of modern war as well as problems of ideological struggle in modern war and questions of cultural education of army members being taken into account. The problems which the authors cover here impart to commanders and all other superiors as well as to party and youth officials in the NVA /National People's Army/ and the border troops of the GDR valuable knowledge and experience, which must be utilized in order to fulfill the mandate of the Eighth Party Congress of the SED: to develop socialist soldiers and fighting collectives with a view to "attaining the best possible results in combat training and in increasing combat readiness, as well as insuring the

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consistent realization of iron discipline and order and strict fulfillment of all orders and service regulations."³

All told, the book represents a valuable addition to Marxist-Leninist literature concerning philosophical problems of military theory and of military practice. The authors have succeeded in creatively applying V. I. Lenin's philosophical heritage, and thus Marxist-Leninist philosophy, to problems of an individual discipline--socialist military science--and to fields connected with it. They show the ideological, epistemological and, above all, methodological significance of V. I. Lenin's heritage for the solution of tasks of this individual discipline and thus present an exemplary creative exposition of the relationship of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and socialist military science. The attentive reader will not fail to notice that the authors are constantly guided by the fact that Marxist-Leninist philosophy does not solve the tasks of socialist military science, but its own /sic/. At the same time he will realize that our philosophy, by proceeding in this manner, is the indispensable methodological prerequisite so that socialist military science can solve its tasks on a scientific basis. For, as a component of Marxism-Leninism, dialectical and historical materialism is the philosophical-methodological basis of socialist military science; it is the scientific-ideological foundation of its superiority over bourgeois military science.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, V. I.: Biographie /Biography/, Berlin 1971, p 364 f.
2. Cf Rau, G., Haendel, P., Kiessling, G.: "Gerechte und ungerechte Kriege" /Just and Unjust Wars/, Berlin 1970, p 42 ff; Kiessling, G.: "Die Leninsche Klassifikation der Kriege nach sozialpolitischen Kriegstypen" /Leninist Classification of Wars According to Socio-political Types/. In SCHRIFTEN DER MILITAERAKADEMIE FRIEDRICH ENGELS, 1972, Issue 106; Militaerlexikon /Military Encyclopedia/, Berlin 1973, p 183 ff; "Kleines politisches Woerterbuch" /Small Political Dictionary/, Berlin 1973, p 467 ff.
3. "Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VII. Parteitag der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands" /Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany/. Speaker: Comrade Erich Honecker. Berlin 1971, p 69.

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REAR SERVICES TRAINING DETAILED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 116A-120A

[By Lt Col K. -H Rath]

/Text/ The new training program for soliders, noncommissioned officers and units of the rear services sets higher standards for combat training, corresponding to the increased demands which must be made of our rear service units. Great demands regarding combat training are a part of the striving for constant high combat readiness. Rear services of all levels must thoroughly prepare in peace for tasks in a possible war.

The program of combat training also serves this purpose. In fulfilling this program, the valuable experiences of the Soviet Army and of the other fraternal armies are utilized creatively, and this is especially the case in solving practical tasks in the field. We are in a position to state that the rear service units are constantly intent on achieving great efforts and that commanding officers as well as leading organs of rear service units are learning better and better how to exercise effective influence on the many-sided implementation of the requirements of the training program and service regulations.

The results which have been achieved in combat training permit the conclusion that the greatest successes are achieved where attention in training is directed to the following:

--Constant improvement of class-determined education of army members with a view to selfless devotion to the working class of the GDR and its Marxist-Leninist party, as well as with a view to loyal fulfillment of the oath of allegiance and to worthy continuation of the traditions of the unit;

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--deepening of the unbreakable class and arms alliance with the Soviet Army and the other armed forces of the Warsaw Pact;

--education with a view to conscious military fulfillment of duty, military mastery in fighting collectives, strict military discipline and order, obedience and unquestioning fulfillment of orders and military regulations;

--deepening of socialist relations between superiors and subordinates and constant consolidation of the military fighting collective;

--qualification of units to act resolutely in modern combat and to completely master weaponry and technology;

--psychological preparation of army members and units in combat training and in the daily performance of duties;

--consistent realization of the principle of repeated training in activities and actions by army members which will have to be performed in combat;

--development of expediency and creativity in the training of subordinates and resolute struggle against any kind of relaxation and simplification of combat training.

Advantages of the New Training Program

This program makes it possible to attain better results in political and combat training. The program is articulate and gives training personnel concrete guidance in conducting combat training. Through good coordination of training subjects of both parts of the program (XII/1 and XIV/1), it makes possible effective and intensive training as well as the achievement of excellent results.

Above all, complexity must be achieved between program parts XII/1 and XIV/1 in the training branches of special tactics, protective training, driver's training and military topography. Complex training requires great physical efforts of trainees and trainers. In such training it is possible, in the interest of the training objective, to utilize factors of individual training branches that influence one another in such a way as to prepare soldiers and units in a thorough manner for solving the combat tasks.

In complex training it is also possible to utilize training time more effectively. Creating training complexes out of different training branches insures unified training with a single schedule. Training elements which are common to several training branches need to be taught thoroughly or practiced only once. Thus, for instance, subject 8/10 of program part XIV/1 has almost the same subject matter elements as topics 1/6 and 4/6 in program part XII/1. By combining these subjects in a complex, it has been

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made possible to conduct extremely intensive training, led centrally by the company commander, in the time available.

The strict division of tactical training into individual, group and platoon training has had a positive effect. This division has led to systematic planning and tactical training and has made it possible constantly to increase the demands made of the personnel. With complex training it is possible to a large extent to centrally plan the use of combat training hardware and to make it available to units. Thus, for instance, units of a motor vehicle transport battalion have been able to go through subjects 2/6 and 8/10 by utilizing all combat training motor vehicles. This central use of hardware has enabled company commanders to have a large number of motor vehicles available, has enabled military drivers to get more time for driving motor vehicles, and has made it possible to substantially increase the time of driving practice.

In addition, such examples as are provided, among others, by the Thurov Unit contribute to better combat training. There, in the months of preparation, planning is preceded by thorough study of combat training documents (training program, catalogs of norms, service regulations, training instructions). This creates favorable conditions for the commanding officer, his deputies and the staff for planning political and combat training in the training semester.

In this way the prerequisites are also improved for preparing the training personnel for their duties.

Experience Gathered in Practice With Troops

The creation of a training group for driver's training in the motor vehicle units has proved its worth. It has organized and implemented the entire driver's training in the motor vehicle units. According to plan, driver's training took place by platoons--3 days for each platoon. After the platoons of a company had completed their training, the remaining hours were used for tests of the 14th, 15th, 17th, 18th and 19th driving exercise within the unit. Then the company exercise had to be passed. Such training, among other things, yielded maximum participation and good results in driver's training and the specialized tactical exercise.

Variants for forming training complexes are presented in table 1. These training complexes at present are to be tried in several troop units. They make it clear how the training of rear services can be developed and implemented in the form of complexes.

In connection with forming complexes in training branches and their points of emphasis (complex training), it must be recognized: To the extent that

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we succeed in implementing complex training maximally and with high practical effect and perfect the curriculum still further, we will also solve the central tasks better and better, especially with regard to time, and attain a higher quality in combat training. This also will contribute to a further heightening of the combat readiness of rear services. We must constantly proceed from the following: The main content and most important demand made of superiors at all levels of command and of all military collectives is the training for closing ranks of units with a view to being ready instantly to fulfill combat tasks.

Table 1. Training Complex Variants

Training complex on subject "Loading and unloading of technology and materiel on or from railroad cars (except Tatra 148 Semitrailer). Maneuvering with Tatra 148 Semitrailer. Driving in urban traffic."

Subject	Hours		Implementing Officer	Time of Day
	1st	2d		
	Training Half Year			
Railroad transport	3		Co Cmdr/Platoon Leader	Day
Driving in urban traffic (18th field exercise)	5	5	Deputy Cmdr for technical equipment	Day/Night
Loading and unloading to and from RR cars (19th field exercise)	4	4	Deputy Cmdr for technical equipment	Day/Night
For Tatra 148: Maneuvering with Tatra 148 Semitrailer cross country and elsewhere			Deputy Cmdr for technical equipment Co Cmdr	Day/Night
--Reversing with tractor trucks in limited area				
--Driving tractor trucks onto semitrailers				

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Table 1 (continued)

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u>		<u>Implementing Officer</u>	<u>Time of Day</u>
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2d</u>		
--Couple semi-trailers (truck tractors straight or at 90 degree angle in front of semitrailers)				
--Reversing with semitrailers				
--Platoon reverses to limited area, to special wall				
	12	9		

Notes: 1. To be planned in 3d or 4th month of training semester, to be executed consecutively the same day.

2. Combat training vehicles to be employed in training (2 or 3 drivers per vehicle), with each driver planned to cover 40 km.

3. Loading and unloading to be executed with the aid of a military loading ramp.

4. The subjects "railroad transport" and "driving in urban traffic" are not to be covered with Tatra 148 semitrailer. Drivers are to be introduced to the subjects in methodically instructive manner.

Training complex on subject "Actions of motor vehicle transport group in accommodation area in anticipation of a possible surprise attack by the enemy. Driving and Orientation in difficult terrain."

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u>		<u>Implementing Officer</u>	<u>Time of Day</u>
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2d</u>		
Training in elements of preparing a phase of combat readiness	3	3	Platoon leader	Night/Day
Group in defense	4		Group leader	Day
Group in defense		4	Group leader	Night

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Table 1 (continued)

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u>		<u>Implementing Officer</u>	<u>Time of Day</u>
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2d</u>		
	<u>Training Half Year</u>			
Actions of group to annihilate diversified groups of a possible enemy	4	4	Group leader	Day/Night
Personal protective equipment and handling of same	2	2	Group leader	Day
Driving in difficult terrain	3	3	Group leader	Day/Night
Orientation in terrain	1		Group leader	Day
Orientation in terrain		1	Group leader	Night
Orientation in terrain with aid of march sketches	<u>3</u> 20	<u>3</u> 20	Group leader	Day/Night

Notes:

1. To be planned for the 1st month of the training semester, but not before integration of soldiers of the first service semester.
2. Implement in training terrain, by platoons or by companies, on two consecutive training days, with field accommodation and mess conditions.
3. Per transport platoon, 3 combat training vehicles are to be planned; and at least 10 km worth of driving per military driver.
4. The subject "driving in difficult terrain" in the complex is to be covered, if possible, on a motor vehicle training course.

Training complex on the subject "Reinforcement of materiel in conditions of complicated situation and terrain"

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u>		<u>Implementing Officer</u>	<u>Time of Day</u>
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2d</u>		
	<u>Training Half Year</u>			
Employment and actions of vehicle				

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Table 1 (continued)

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u>		<u>Implementing Officer</u>	<u>Time of Day</u>
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2d</u>		
transport platoon for fulfilling re- inforcement tasks and for transport of wounded	7	7	Co Cmdr/Platoon Leader	Day/Night
Makeshift preparation of meals	2	2	Group leader	Day
Driving in columns	3	3	Platoon leader	Day/Night
Driving in columns in terrain	4	4	Platoon leader	Day/Night
	16	16		

Notes:

1. The complex may be planned as tactical training for the 3d or 4th month of the training semester.
2. At least 50 percent of the combat vehicles may be employed. Plan about 50 km worth of driving for each military driver.
3. The complex must be safeguarded by medical services motor vehicle maintenance services.

I would like to point out that it is necessary more than heretofore to apply pertinent norms, in accordance with the catalog of norms, to the main points of training and to check them more strictly and without any concessions during the tests and comparisons of efforts.

A prerequisite for high-quality training is the thorough preparation of training personnel. It must precede any training and is considered a decisive criterion of effective and high-level combat training. Experience shows that primarily the following conditions must be met:

1. The regular courses for noncommissioned officers in motor vehicle units in the months in which the preparation takes place must be developed and implemented more carefully. The courses must be oriented concretely and methodically correctly toward the development of training in the coming

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training semester, with the experience of the previous semester being taken into account.

2. More influence should be exercised on the quality of the preparation of training personnel and on more regularly conducting instructional checks with training personnel. The quality of personal training materials and instructions is to be increased.
3. The setting of tasks concerning the aim, content, method, organization and safeguarding of the training to be conducted and of methodical instructive training is to be personally implemented and improved by superiors, within the framework of preparing training personnel for their duties. The preparation for their duties must be checked. The superior must prepare training personnel by groups for the training measures to be taken.
4. In preparing training personnel in a methodical instructive manner, certain training elements are to be concretely worked out. Under the superior's guidance, training personnel alternately act as trainers and trainees. It should constantly be the aim to develop the noncommissioned officers' (trainers') practical abilities to lead groups, garrisons, services and detachments in combat. This training is to be oriented toward mastery of weaponry and technology as well as toward perfecting methodical abilities, with main emphasis on training in the field.

It has also proved expedient to show training films concerning the subjects of the program prior to training. This opportunity is not utilized everywhere, however. Training films are recommended for the following subjects: Camouflage, close combat against tanks, protective measures following the employment of chemical weapons by the enemy, military transport by rail, reinforcement in combat, fuel supply in combat, rationalization of loading and unloading of supplies.

Planning, Control and Reports

First let us point out once more that all tasks by units of the rear services for training in other military categories and services (maneuvers, combat firing, bivouacs, and so forth) are to be regarded as combat training and to be utilized for training soldiers and units. This is to insure, among other things, that, for instance, a cook, the driver of a fuel supply vehicle or an ambulance driver puts in the required number of hours in training categories stipulated by the training program. The hours spent in special tactical training, within the framework of set tasks, must be included in control and reports. This is especially true of work and training in the second and third semester in the field of specialized training.

In control and reports concerning the results in political and combat training as well as in the competition for top performance /Bestenbewegung/,

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the following is required, among other things: high level of staff, articulateness, checks agreeing with actual training accomplishments, and completeness of documentation. Checks of obligations and their fulfillment as well as of classifications shall be conducted monthly. What counts here primarily is monthly evaluation, assessment, and control of results in the combat training control book.

Above all, this article is intended to evaluate experience and to stimulate discussion in this journal. In the discussion, additional experience should be described, and proposals should be submitted on how and in which fields political and combat training can be organized and implemented even better. In so doing, the objective should be a further increase in combat readiness of the rear services of the army.

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BATTALION ORGANIZATION OF CHEMICAL, NUCLEAR PROTECTION MEASURES DESCRIBED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 121A-122A

[By Lt Col K. Till, engineer]

/Text/ Measures for the protection against means of mass destruction (MVM Portection) include a multitude of tasks that extend from early reconnaissance of the enemy's preparations for the employment of MVM, through the prevention of the employment of these means to the rapid elimination of the consequences of the enemy employment of MVM. From this it is evident that the realization of MVM protection requires a close cooperation of the different branches of service and special troops. MVM protection has the objective of limiting the effect of enemy MVM and maintaining the combat value of friendly troops. This objective can only be attained if the proper prerequisites are created already in the course of the training process, particularly in tests of the combat readiness and resolution as well as through tactical exercises. These preconditions include among others:

--usable knowledge on the part of the personnel concerning the combat characteristics and effects of the enemy MVM and of protective measures against them,

--flawless and up-to-standards handling of personal protective clothing and equipment,

--familiarity with warning signals,

--mastery of the principles governing the commitment of the non TOE/E groups for radiation and chemical reconnaissance by all officers of the MSB/PB /motorized rifle battalion/tank battalion/,

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--a good training level for such units,

--familiarity and skills in the manipulation of the instruments for the radiation and chemical reconnaissance and dosage measurement on the part of all officers, NCO's and non TOE/E units as well as the operational readiness of these instruments and of the personal protective equipment,

--issue, observance of the rules for carrying and of the periodical baking of the dosage meter as well as preparation for incurred dosage reports on friendly personnel,

--periodic carrying out of controls of protective masks to ascertain their imperviousness.

It is important to create these prerequisites because as a rule the MVM protection has to be carried out with organic forces and means by the MSB/PB. The assignment of chemical defense units to the MSB/PB represents an exception. The commander and the staff of the MSB/PB organize the MVM protection according to the stipulations of service regulations DV 046/0003 and 250/0/001.

The basis for the organization of the MVM protection is provided by the combat mission of the MSB/PB, the operational instructions given by the commander of the MSB/PB for the MVM protection as well as the conclusions from the estimate of the situation. In particular the following points have to be evaluated by the commander of the MSB/PB:

--what opportunities does the enemy have for the employment of MVM and at what point in time is their employment to be anticipated?

--what influence does the KC /nuclear/chemical/ situation have on the actions of the MSB/PB?

--what kind of chemical barriers have been employed by the enemy and what influence do they have on the anticipated courses of action?

--what is the status of unit training in MVM?

--what is the status of personnel issue with MVM protective equipment, instruments and means for nuclear/chemical reconnaissance, for special handling, and what is their condition?

--what influence do the terrain and the meteorological conditions have on the diffusion and residual character of chemical agents?

--which terrain sectors can be made impassable through the employment of nuclear weapons, through destruction, flooding, terrain barriers and fires and to what degree?

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--what cover and concealment characteristics does the terrain possess and how may these be made use of by the units?

The content of the estimate of the situation makes it evident how extensive must be the knowledge possessed by commanders and officers of the MSB/PB staff in order to arrive in every kind of combat situation to the kind of conclusions that form the basis for a purposeful decision. After giving the combat order the MSB/PB commander gives the instructions pertaining to protective measures against the means of mass destruction.

This instruction must include:

--the missions of the nuclear/chemical reconnaissance (observation); what forces and means are active, when and in which direction, when and where nuclear/chemical observation posts must be posted, the method, and type as well as time frequency of the transmission of reports;

--the utilization of the protective characteristics of the terrain for the cover and concealment of personnel and combat equipment, as well as the combat engineer terrain improvement required;

--measures for the monitoring of the efficacy of personal protective equipment, execution of tests for the functioning of protective masks, controls concerning the operational readiness of the equipment and means of nuclear/chemical reconnaissance, for dosage control and special measures;

--the sequence of reinforcement with nuclear/chemical equipment and means, where and in what degree reserves are to be deployed;

--the means of crossing affecting sectors, actions in affected sectors, necessary protective measures, the execution of special measures with organic forces and means;

--the preparation and issue of food, the control and utilization of water points, water preparation, sanitary-hygienic measures;

--the control of the dosage received by personnel (dosimetrics); reports concerning dosage received;

--warning signals and the type and means of their transmission and reproduction;

--the forces and means for the elimination of the consequences of enemy employment of MVM which have to be kept in reserve, the organization of their employment and leadership;

--methods of cooperation with units of the chemical defense and their place in the approach or combat orders as well as their tasks.

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The content of these instructions is not identical in every case. It depends primarily on the combat mission, the preceding or anticipated actions of the enemy, the character of the terrain and the meteorological conditions.

In certain combat situations only a precise definition and updating of these instructions concerning the forces and means as well as the time and place of their employment is required.

Specifications of the MVM protection measures are to be made depending on the situation created by the total combat picture, particularly if the enemy has employed MVM for the first time or repeatedly. In such situations it is required to reorganize the missions of the

- nuclear/chemical reconnaissance (monitoring);
- the actions in affected areas (sectors);
- the deployment of forces and means for the elimination of the consequences of the enemy action; as well as
- the execution of special measures.

These MVM protective measures are to be realized after the employment of MVM only in close coordination with a series of other measures for the restoration of the combat capability of the MSB/PB units. These measures include, among others:

- the organization of the restoration of command and control,
- the organization of first aid for casualties and their evacuation to the medical service installations,
- the extinguishing of fires,
- the specification of combat missions,
- the warning of neighboring units and other units in the area, and
- if necessary, the organization of the re-grouping of units, their supply with equipment, arms, ammunition, POL and other logistical requirements.

Following the organization of the MVM protection, staff officers are to assign the control and instructional task for these measures in the individual units.

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TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE AFFECTS AIR FORCE/AIR DEFENSE COMMAND READINESS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 98B-104B

[By author's collective under the guidance of Maj Gen M Lange]

/Excerpt/ With the development of modern combat equipment, a number of changes have occurred: The combat equipment became more complicated. It attained an unprecedented destructive force; the speed and range of important combat means were increased substantially.

In the development of the air force and air defense this can be demonstrated with the following facts:

It took 26 years to increase the speed of aircraft from 150 to 550 km per hour, 14 years to increase their speed from 1200 to 2000 km per hour.

It took only a few years to build strategic rockets with an average speed that is twenty times higher than that of the strategic bombers.

In the process, military equipment became constantly more complicated. Fifteen to 20 years ago equipment on the average contained 700 to 800 individual parts and today already 1400 to 1500.¹

From this certain conclusions can be drawn. The qualitative changes in the weaponry and technical equipment of the LSK/LV that combine all the progress attained in the field of science and technology, place the highest requirements on the qualifications of army members in all sectors of military life. A central problem posed here is the mastery of the equipment, its effective and dependable operation. "The best combat means provide their advantages

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only where army members show a full mastery over their operation, their maintenance and repair, coupled with a high fighting morale, based on socialist convictions of principle. The mastery of equipment by army members represents in this sense a decisive component of military superiority."²

While it was possible in the past to balance one or the other component in the course of a war with an increased exertion of strength, it is necessary nowadays to develop all components uniformly in the preparation of troops for combat. This means: Only those troops can gain victory today who are superior to the enemy politically and ideologically as well as in their mental and physical capabilities and who dispose over modern combat equipment. "In a modern war the morale factor can play its decisive role not by itself, but only in connection with the material factor."³

The interrelationship between man and equipment is thus being strengthened continuously. It is therefore not sufficient any longer to draw the general conclusion that the role of man and equipment is increasingly important in modern war. It is necessary to take account of new developments in this interrelationship.

The Introduction of New and Complicated Combat Equipment with Ever Greater Frequency

The Air Force and Air Defense Command of the NVA dispose of modern and complicated weapons systems. To guarantee their efficacy both individually and in combination, requires both an excellent state of care and maintenance of equipment and primarily a high state of training on the part of army members. Only in this way can the tactical and technical parameters of the equipment be fully utilized. It becomes evident in this connection that the renewal of the material-technical basis of troop units takes place in ever shorter time frames, that the number of new types of weapons is increasing and that the new combat equipment that is issued as a rule becomes ever more complicated.

This statement is evidenced by the following in the development of weapons systems for air defense:

1. The advantages of the socialist production method are constantly being put to better use to gear combat equipment to the needs of man. Thus certain mental and manual activities have been taken over by computers and automated equipment as, for example, automatic pilots and guidance systems for weapons and equipment. Nevertheless the stress on the human operator does not decrease by any means. A series of factors are at work in this which result from the construction and equipment of modern interceptor aircraft of the present and next generation. In this connection the following should be mentioned:

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--the increasing speed and altitude characteristics (MIG-15/17, max speed to 1200 km/h, top altitude around 16,000 m; MIG 21, max speed around 2400 km/h, max altitude around 20,000 m);

--the ever more extensive cockpit equipment;

--the more complicated navigational equipment of the aircraft in most flight phases;

--the increase in combat possibilities; based on the weaponry variations;

--the increasing dependence of the separate flight phases on ground systems;

--the greater requirements placed on the knowledge and skills of the aircraft commander during the occurrence of special in-flight situations.

All told, the number of data that an aircraft commander has to absorb, process and convert to concrete actions in an extremely rapid sequence is growing many times over.

Flight skills must be measured by increasingly strict standards and this is not only true for extremely low, or low altitude flights at high rates of speed. In general it can be said that the piloting of a modern fighter aircraft during certain flight phases pushes the plane commander to the limit of his psychic and physical capabilities. The conduct of an aerial engagement, the simultaneous action of factors of varied kinds, are today placing extraordinary demands on the intellectual and physical capability of man.

2. The rapid development in all sectors of aircraft technology has led to a situation in which--at present and in the future as well--extremely complicated and at the same time highly capable technical systems are being entrusted to the engineering/technical personnel. Their maintenance requires excellent military and expert knowledge together with high conscientiousness from the members of the aviation engineering service.

During the 1950s a fighter aircraft contained about 1500 to 3000 electronic tubes and semiconductors, by 1960 this number had increased to about 10,000 and today a modern fighter aircraft contains more than 15,000 transistors and diodes. This resulted in entirely new tasks for the care and maintenance of equipment. Changes in the delimitation of the classical work sectors of the aviation engineering service can also be noticed today. Whereas until now there were clearly-delimited sectors, such as engine/fuel cell communication and radar equipment, special electronic equipment and armament, each of which had their fixed task sectors for mechanics, technicians and engineers, the following tendency has become visible with the introduction of the most modern fighter aircraft:

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The engine and special electronic equipment sectors merge in the case of jet engines and after burner maintenance, and the sectors fuel cell and special electronic equipment merge when it comes to aircraft guidance and fuel pumping systems. The weaponry and radar sectors jointly use radar information and data that are significant as base or intermediate values in the engagement of targets.

Specialists in one technical sector therefore are facing the growing necessity of acquiring skills in the adjoining technical sectors. Only thus will they be in a position to understand and to master the total functioning of an installation of a system or of a circuit.

3. The anti-aircraft missile complexes that are available to the air force and air defense troops permit the extremely effective engagement of the aerial enemy and to fulfill the entrusted responsible task for secure protection of the air space of the GDR and of the socialist community of states dependably in cooperation with the fighter aircraft. The effective commitment of these highly perfected and yet complicated combat means, however, puts great demands on personnel, particularly on the technical skills of the rated specialists. A radar operator of the anti-aircraft missile troops, for instance, differs basically from the guidance cannonier of a former anti-aircraft artillery unit. He not only executed commands but is himself responsible to a high degree for the tracking and destruction of aerial targets. The conditions under which he works require a high political conscience, a well-developed sense of responsibility and a collective spirit. The capacity to successfully undergo high physical and psychic stress, to concentrate, a balanced personality, excellent vision, decisiveness and quick reactions--these are essential prerequisites for his activity. He requires knowledge in the sectors of electronic, low frequency, impulse and high frequency technology; must be familiar with coordinate systems, with motion parameters of aerial targets and anti-aircraft missiles, missile guidance systems, guidance errors and guidance circuits for an anti-aircraft rocket, and finally he must possess knowledge concerning the aerial enemy, concerning the important principles of commitment, the employment of maneuvers as well as of active and passive jamming methods. The demand placed on the personnel of the radio-technical troops are of a similar nature. Beyond this, the radar operator must have a mastery of the extensive control procedures of his system; he has to be in a position to recognize failures and in part to eliminate them himself.

The thoughts presented here point to specific problems that are to be considered in the activity of commanders, political workers, technicians and engineers. All told there emerges the following conclusion: The mastery of modern combat equipment requires that army members receive a good general military education as well as an extensive specialized training and work continuously on the perfection of their knowledge and skills.

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The Political-Ideological and Special Professional Qualification of the Engineer-Technical Personnel

All commanders, political organs and the engineer-technical personnel have to understand that one of their basic, most important and most complicated tasks is represented by the accomplishment of military-technical training. It is important to bring this about systematically and at a high level and to devote the proper attention primarily to political-ideological work as well as to the activity of the Party and the FDJ organizations. In this, the experiences of our Soviet class comrades and comrades-in-arms are of great usefulness. The main directions of party-political work established in the Soviet instructional text for the training of fighters to attain an excellent mastery of combat equipment and armament show us the directions of our own efforts.⁴

Several results emerge from this for the military-technical training and advanced training in the officer academy as well as in the units and formations of the service. Thus thorough training in equipment nowadays requires well-selected teaching materials. Detailed instruction should be devoted only to those parts and mechanisms with which the army member is directly concerned; the others should be communicated in the form of a general survey. Under such a procedure time reserves are made available for the development of skills in handling of the equipment and the theoretical bases of the construction of our combat equipment can be dealt with more extensively.

As already mentioned, the latest technical discoveries, particularly perceptions in the areas of electronics, cybernetics and automation, play a role now in the equipment and weapons systems of the Air Force and Air Defense Command. The members of our service must comprehend and understand the physical and technical processes which are being employed for the operation of our ever more complicated combat equipment. It is necessary that they know the conditions under which combat equipment reaches its maximum potential for the fulfillment of the combat mission and that they know how failures and interruptions can be eliminated in short order.

The knowledge required today extends considerably beyond the direct framework of the respective technical sector. Soviet military science provides us with the appropriate references in this connection. The more complicated the equipment and its operation, the more necessary it becomes to communicate along with scientific knowledge concerning the operation of the equipment also that knowledge which pertains to the human organism.

Investigations in radar and missile units have revealed that under equal conditions those radar operators achieved the best results who possessed basic physiological and psychological knowledge and employed their knowledge in their work (for instance correct work conduct, physiology of sight, the laws of cognition, of volition).⁵

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Intensifying Thinking and Acting in Equal Measure

The dynamics of modern combat, the continual lessening of the time available for the fulfillment of certain combat tasks, make it necessary that time sequences in the operation of combat equipment are continually shortened. At the same time greater precision is required of army members in their actions.

The composition and the characteristics of modern military equipment, the requirement for consciously and actively engaged soldier personalities, considering the time limits available for training on equipment, coupled with the requirement for complete mastery of the equipment under the conditions of limited periods of military service--all this leads to training methods that put the accent on the equal intensification of thinking and acting. The noted military pedagogue, V. I. Luzkov writes in this connection: "More than ever today the perfection of military mastery depends on the psychological preparation of the soldier for his task. It is known for instance that man can at most recognize 5 to 9 individual objects in a connected relationship and that the human arm can make about 5.2 movements per second without strain, but the lower arm 8, and the hand up to 11.4. The minimal reaction time to signals in quick sequence amounts to 0.25 seconds; the interval limit between signals that still allow a proper reaction amounts to 0.5 seconds. Human thought takes place at a speed of 20 to 30 operations per second. One recognizes that the human being has to operate within certain limits. If he wants to overcome these he must raise the absolute and relative sensitivity of the sensory organs through proper exercises, to shorten the reaction time, to increase the resistance of the organism, and thus to lower the duration of fatigue or to postpone fatigue."⁶

Investigations have disclosed that the combat readiness of troops depends on the one hand on the extent to which the technical combat equipment is geared to the potential of the operating and handling personnel and on the other hand, on the capability of the soldiers to adapt themselves to the equipment and to use it effectively. It is important to develop in all army members a feeling of high responsibility in order that the weapons and equipment are cared for and maintained at a high level allowing them to fully unfold their combat possibilities. In this connection, it is essential that the army members are made familiar with the methods of the search for defects and of defect elimination, with the organization of the technical service, with the types of usage and material-technical supply processes. Practice has shown that in the case of weekly training in defect search and elimination as much as 30 percent of the time required can be saved.

It is important to include the mechanics, radar operators and other personnel in these efforts. In this, too, we ought to use the methods that have proved successful in the Soviet Army and utilize defect search algorithms, channel diagrams, resistance and voltage measuring cards, calibration, fine tuning, assembly and disassembly instructions.

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To Learn Even More from the Experiences of our Soviet Class Comrades

Altogether the rich experiences of our Soviet comrades-in-arms ought to be used even more extensively than heretofore. This applies to the study of the pertinent literature, the direct exchange of experiences between units and formations of the Soviet Army and the NVA as well as the joint work in Soviet training institutions. There are already good examples of officer candidates being instructed by Soviet instructors in courses of several days duration in a training center of the GSFG /Group of Soviet Forms in Germany/.⁷ The successful use of Soviet military equipment in the fight against the enemy's modern air attack means as employed in the defense against imperialist aggressive actions in Southeast Asia and also in the Near East of course merits proper attention. It furnishes us with important lessons for the proper representation of the man-equipment interactions.

Army members are to be trained in such a way that they love the combat equipment entrusted to them, that they are convinced of the dependability and superiority of the Soviet equipment--this is a basic task of our military-technical propaganda.

This has to happen continuously within the framework of the training process, in combat training, during exercises and maneuvers and in daily political mass work.

Our military-technical propaganda is based on the experiences of the Soviet Army. For their further activation we need to employ all those who graduated from institutions of higher learning academies in the Soviet Union and also in our Republic. It is important to fit the theme treatment to the respective audience. In this connection a few basic principles must be observed without fail:

--Army members must receive timely access to the military-technical knowledge that pertains to their weapons system.

--The successful operation of complicated military equipment requires in many cases the acquisition of knowledge in related technical fields beyond one's own. Efforts in this direction must be reinforced.

--The methodological skills of the technical trainers are a decisive prerequisite for the increase of the military knowledge and skills of personnel. In order to diffuse technical knowledge rapidly and well, the propagation of tested and of new methods is essential.

Main Attention to be Devoted to the Education of Army Members

In our training activity, all army members are to be instructed time and again that the equipment entrusted to us is the people's property and that

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it is to be cared for and maintained. Involved are substantial values, the objectified work of thousands of workers, engineers, technicians and scientists.

If equipment and property are treated negligently and premature losses occur, our Republic sustains a double loss: not only is there a waste of expensively-built material means, but the combat value of the services, formations and units is lowered as well.

This is why an essential duty of commanders, political workers and engineering-technical personnel requires the training of all army members in the strict observance of service regulations, operational procedures and of safety regulations.

In his contribution to the discussion at the 13th plenary session of the SED Central Committee, Colonel General Heinz Kessler stated that the standards set for the further strengthening of discipline, the accomplishment of an exact military order, the mastery of modern combat equipment and first of all for the leadership of the ideological work will have to be more strict. This conclusion also applies to the solution of the problems listed in the present contribution. We are guided in this by the fact that the "decisive task" for the creation of a high state of combat readiness "is the political education of each member of the armed forces, the acquisition and deepening of solid and immovable Marxist-Leninist basic convictions and of a strong class standpoint.⁸ This must be reflected in the relations between man and equipment.

War has always been and will always be connected with unprecedented stress on the individual fighter. Daring, boldness, bravery and self-sacrifice have been and will remain qualities that will decisively determine the actions of the socialist soldier personality. But today these qualities of themselves are not sufficient. The rapid development of technology increases the specific requirements that are placed on man to a substantial degree.

In a modern war the effect of the morale factor must be seen in close connection with the commitment of modern war materiel. The higher morale that distinguishes the socialist fighter must express itself to a large extent in the general mastery of modern combat equipment and the maximum use of its combat qualities in the interests of gaining victory over the enemy, even under the most difficult conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. Luzkov, V. N.: "Methoden der Ausbildung" ("Instructional Methods"), Berlin, 1973, p 43.

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2. Honecker, E.: "Zuverlaessiger Schutz des Sozialismus" ("Dependable Protection of Socialism"), Berlin, 1973, p 181.
3. Authors' Collective Led by Milovidov, A. S. and Koslov, V. G., "Das Philosophische Erbe Lenins und die Probleme des Modernen Krieges" ("The Philosophical Heritage of Lenin and the Problems of Modern War"), op. cit., p 240.
4. Authors' Collective Led by Mareyev, I.S., "Die Parteipolitische Arbeit in der Sowjetarmee und der Sowjetkriegsflotte" ("The Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy"), op. cit., p 366.
5. Luzkov, V. N., "Methoden der Ausbildung" ("Instructional Methods"), op. cit., p 45.
6. Op. cit., p 46.
7. Engelstaedter, W., in MILITAERWESEN , Berlin, 1974, p 102-104.
8. Keller, H., "Das vom Volk Geschaffene Wird Zuverlaessig Geschuetzt" ("What Was Created by the People is Protected Dependably"), 13th Plenum Discussion, Berlin, 1974, p 113.

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CONCEPTS OF AERIAL COMBAT PRESENTED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 110B-113B

[By Col Dr F. Beer, military scientist]

/Excerpt/ How can the influence of combat characteristics on the effectiveness of the interception of aerial targets be taken account of in the command activity of commanders when they formulate combat decisions? This happens through the calculation and evaluation of the combat potential. By combat potential for the interception and destruction of aerial targets is understood the anticipated result of the combat deployment of interceptor fighters in their execution of a specific combat task under actual conditions. Combat potential expresses quantitatively the effectiveness of the combat deployment of interceptor aircraft by means of the anticipated result of their combat actions. The concept of combat potential thus is substantially wider than the concept of combat characteristics. It takes into account as many as possible of the characteristics and factors that have a substantial impact on the capability of interceptors to carry out combat actions.

Combat experiences in Vietnam and the Near East have shown that the results of aerial combat actions depend particularly on the following factors:

- the status of training and of the fighting morale of the aircraft commanders,
- the determination and courage of their actions,
- the purposeful and consistent command and control of the fighter forces from the ground and in the air,

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--the purposefulness of the tactical methods employed in combat, the intelligent and skillful exploitation of the advantages of friendly aircraft in consideration of the combat potential of the enemy.

This is why an assessment of the combat potential and their evaluation in the interest of the commander's decision making processes, must take their point of departure always from the anticipated situation. These calculations always have a very specific content and as a rule do not lead to generally valid statements that are applicable in all kinds of situations.

On the other hand, there exist naturally average combat potential for fighter aircraft which expresses the probable results of combat deployment for the interception and destruction of aerial targets under typical, average conditions. These depend primarily on the combat characteristics of the combat, command and security equipment, and can be calculated to the extent that these combat characteristics are known, using more or less complicated mathematical methods and can be represented in the form of numerical values, nomographs, tables etc. All responsible staff officers can work these out in advance and incorporate them into the permanent background data of their working documents.

Criteria of Combat Potential

The commander who makes an estimate of combat potential for the fulfillment of a specifically-ordered combat mission must answer the question in which area, how fast and with which quality or effectiveness this task can be executed. He must thus assess three aspects of the combat potential.

1. the spatial opportunities,
2. the time opportunities and
3. the effectiveness of the combat actions (results of the fulfillment of the combat mission).

These aspects of the combat potential are expressed quantitatively through appropriate criteria of combat potential (spatial, time and probability criteria).

The spatial potential of interceptor aircraft for the fulfillment of combat tasks are expressed quantitatively by sectors. Such sectors are the radius of action, the possible sectors of the combat deployment of interceptor aircraft according to approach sectors, heights and velocities, the sectors of potential attack in aerial combat and the potential fire zones.

The radius of action, meaning the air space within which interceptor aircraft have the capability of intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft, is determined especially by the following combat characteristics:

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--the flight range and flight duration of the interceptor aircraft or its radius of tactical action;

--the height at which the interceptor and its weaponry is committed.

The possible zones of the combat deployment are expressed by the altitude/velocity diagrams of friendly and enemy aircraft and other characteristics.

The zones of possible attack and possible fire, that is to say the maximum and minimum possible target distances as well as the range of the aircraft depending on the direction, represent the influence of the combat characteristics of the weapons system and the on-board radar instrumentation range of the interceptor aircraft on its combat deployment.

The time horizon of the interceptor aircraft for the accomplishment of combat tasks is indicated quantitatively by various time values that characterize the combat readiness of the aircraft for combat deployment as well as the duration of the interception process and its various phases.

The criteria of combat readiness as a rule are norm times, for instance time of transition from one degree of operational readiness to a higher one, elapsed time to takeoff by the interceptor after receipt of the scramble order and elapsed time to attainment of the approach flight path. These criteria are influenced significantly by the maintenance condition, the takeoff conditions, the acceleration capability and other combat characteristics of the aircraft.

The efficacy of the combat deployment of the interceptor aircraft illustrates the degree, extent or quality with which the combat task is accomplished. Since the combat deployment for the interception and destruction of aerial targets frequently takes place under similar conditions and therefore has a certain mass character, its efficacy is expressed by means of probability criteria which are frequently described as effectiveness criteria. The proper effectiveness criterium must be determined in relation to the individual combat mission and the conditions of the engagement. The following typical variations may occur in case of combat deployment for the interception and destruction of aerial targets:

Table 1. Variants of Combat Deployment

Engagement Conditions	Combat Mission	Effectiveness Criterium
1. A single aerial target seeks to penetrate the air defense system	Interception and Destruction of the aerial target	Destruction Probability of the aerial target

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Table 1 (continued)

2. A group of aerial targets seek to penetrate the air defense system	Interception and destruction of the greatest possible number of targets	Mathematical expectation of the number of targets destroyed
	Interception and destruction of all targets	Probability that all targets are intercepted and destroyed.
	Interception and destruction of a specifically ordered number of targets	Probability of interception and destruction of at least the ordered number of targets.
3. The enemy overflies the air defense corridor or sector as a target of opportunity	Interception and destruction of the greatest number of targets in the sector or corridor	Mathematical expectation of the number of destroyed targets in the pertinent sector (corridor).
	Engagement of all targets	Probability that all radar guide tracks are engaged and that a target can overfly the sector (corridor) with impunity.

The Interception Probability

Irrespective of which effectiveness criterium the commander selects for the calculation and assessment of the combat potential, its determination must take into account the effectiveness of the individual interceptor aircraft in the interception of an aerial target. This is characterized by the so-called interception probability of the aerial target.

The interception probability expresses the influence of the combat characteristics of the aircraft and of its weapons system as well as of its command and control equipment on the result of the interception (aerial target destroyed or not destroyed). It takes into consideration all phases of the interception process, particularly the two main phases: the guiding of the interceptor aircraft towards the target and the aerial engagement.

In the first main phase the interceptor is guided by ground means to such close proximity of the aerial target that the aircraft commander can get a fix on the target and subsequently commence the aerial engagement. The

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combat potential in this phase is determined from the point of view of effectiveness by the probability of the successful conduct of the interceptor aircraft to the aerial target by ground means, which depends on the combat characteristics of the fighter ground to air control means and on the different combat characteristics of the aircraft particularly on its maneuverability during banking maneuvers.

During the engagement phase the aircraft commander of the interceptor aircraft independently approaches the aerial target after he has a fix on it and commences the attack. He places himself in a good firing position, launches the rockets or opens fire and destroys the target. The effectiveness of this phase is characterized by the destruction probability of the aerial target in the course of an aerial engagement. This depends in particular on the combat characteristics of the on-board guidance system and the weapons system besides the different tactical/technical characteristics of the interceptor aircraft.

The determination of the interception probability of aerial targets through the commitment of modern interceptor aircraft under different conditions is the most difficult part of the methodology in the computation and assessment of the combat potential inasmuch as complicated inter-relationships exist between its component parts and the combat characteristics of the aircraft. This probability can be computed according to the following formula in a most general way.

$$P_A = P_h \times P_v \times k_z.$$

P_A --Interception probability of the aerial target,

P_h --Probability of successful approach,


P_v --Destruction probability of the aerial target in an engagement,

k_z --Dependability (survival probability) of the elements of the interception system.

The criteria of combat opportunities are determined in the practical work of the commanders and staffs according to special computing methods that are standard for all sectors. The methodology of the operational/tactical computations is illustrated in special instructions. In the case of the combat deployment of interceptor aircraft, these are primarily navigational/tactical and engineering/navigational computations.

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Illustration 1. Methodology of Computation and Assessment of Combat Opportunities of the Interceptor Aircraft




Key:

1. Combat Potential of the Interceptor Aircraft
2. Probable Result of the Combat Deployment according to Computations
3. Assessment
4. Required Result of the combat deployment according to combat mission
5. Criteria of Combat Potential
6. Spatial Criteria
7. Time Criteria
8. Probability Criteria
9. Partial Criteria
10. Influence Values (Characteristics, Factors)

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Illustration 2. Criteria of Combat Opportunities of the Interceptor



Key:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Spatial Criteria | 9. norm time of combat readiness |
| 2. Time Criteria | 10. duration of combat sortie |
| 3. Probability Criteria | 11. preparation time for repeat start |
| 4. zone of action | 12. duration of air alert patrols |
| 5. approach sectors | 13. combat tension |
| 6. tactical action radius | 14. probability of approach |
| 7. Flight-Velocity Sectors | 15. destruction probability |
| 8. sector of possible attacks (firing) | 16. dependability of the interception system |

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INFORMATION PROVIDED ON SPECIALIZED TRAINING OF FLIGHT PERSONNEL

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 114B-117B

[By Lt Col J. Knie]

/Text/ The education and training of pilots, who must master aircraft as a weapon under all circumstances, is in the center of the combat training of the air force. The report of the SED Central Committee to the Eighth Party Congress states in this connection: "The increase in the battle strength and combat readiness of the National People's Army requires class-conscious combatants, who master socialist military science on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory and modern means of leadership, armament, and technology. This poses increasing requirements on education and training."¹

One of the most important requirements on military qualification is conformity between theoretical knowledge and practical skills. High military qualification demands in a comprehensive sense: a unity of very good political, general military, and specialized knowledge which is based on firm class consciousness. Effective education and training must therefore make sure that all training potentials are being converted into knowledge, skills, and capabilities on a scientific basis. What matters in this respect is to convey only such knowledge, skills, and capabilities, which are a necessary requirement for the fulfillment of combat tasks. What is required therefore is a meaningful conveyance of knowledge, which is limited by the concrete tasks and concentrated on the essential. The conveyance of unusable knowledge is a waste of training time and a loss of combat potential. A constant optimal development of specialized and advanced training ensures a continuous increase of the training level of pilots and has thereby a decisive influence on combat readiness. A lack of theoretical knowledge contributes to the causes of flight accidents and the accidents

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themselves. This results in a high responsibility of all commanders, which can be expressed in the following principles:

1. Education problems and education questions permeate all spheres of society.
2. Education questions as leadership problems must play an essential role in the command process and the work of every commander. Educational ideas are an essential component of command deliberations.
3. Determination and concrete preparation of the main substantive aspects and material consequences of education is part of the permanent planned work of every commander and of every command.

The annual plan of specialized training must reflect the training level of the pilots and the tasks of the regiment, indicate material consequences, and contain plan positions which can be accounted for in terms of content and materially.

Goals of Specialized and Advanced Training

The goal consists in the development of specialized knowledge, capabilities, and skills required for the successful execution of combat training and for actual combat.

This includes:

- constant perfecting of knowledge dealing with the tactics of combat events with full utilization of the technical and tactical application capacities of the weapons systems;
- systematic increase of the training level and performance classification of pilots;
- exact execution of the flight assignment without flight accidents or creating conditions for flight accidents;
- retraining of pilots for new weapons systems and their preparation for combat action in the shortest possible time.

Specialized training and advanced training must be constantly developed as an active and creative process. It must take account of the complexity of pilot training. Building on the basis of constantly provided basic knowledge, specialized training and advanced training has the purpose of developing operational procedures enabling pilots to carry out complex flight assignments under all conditions of a tactical air situation.

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Modern weapons systems of our air force require for full utilization of their combat capacities a systematic acquisition of usable knowledge, capabilities, and skills. This must therefore be one of the training priorities. Content, form, and methodology must be oriented to this priority. The goal is therefore not only the conveyance of new knowledge but also the firming up and retention of knowledge already acquired. Only stable knowledge can be applied in practice. Theory is the basis for any kind of activity. Every success in the air must be prepared on the ground.

Development of Content

The content of specialized training and advanced training is determined by: weapons and equipment, the findings of socialist military science, the requirements of basic aviation principles, the results of research in aviation medicine, the concrete tasks for the respective training year, and the training level of pilots. The following training specialties are included: tactical and technical training, aviation theory, and navigation training and advanced training, as well as training in specialized fields.

Tactical training is the nucleus of specialized training and advanced training. It creates the theoretical preconditions for the conduct of air combat under different conditions of a tactical air situation. The following principles must be considered in tactical training:

- the entire tactical training must be related to practice;
- it must be a component of daily combat training;
- tactical findings must determine the content of combat training exercises.

The following is being taught in tactical training:

- the functions of pilots in the duty system, the tasks during transition to a higher level of combat readiness,
- defense against violators of the air space,
- regulation of cooperation with other service branches and neighbors,
- the experience and results of real combat actions in order to develop skill and shrewdness in air combat,
- combat against ground and sea targets with the different weapons variants,
- methods of air reconnaissance.

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Tactical training must always be a means for an end and a basis for combat-related training. There should be no tactical principles of combat action which are not being considered in combat training.

Training in aviation theory deals with the immediate aerodynamic problems of flight practice. Victory in air combat depends decisively on maximal utilization of the combat characteristics of the aircraft. Practical aerodynamics is therefore an important training branch. Modern aircraft, which expand especially the range of altitude and speed and effect overall qualitative changes of aerodynamic characteristics, demand of the pilots constantly applicable knowledge of practical aerodynamics. This requires also comparisons with the technology of the adversary in order to determine, on hand of a comparison of aerodynamic behavior of the aircraft, advantages and disadvantages and tactical rules for combat action.

Training Priorities

There are three priorities in the development of specialized training and advanced training.

The first priority, which is also the main priority, comprises the firming up and retention of basic knowledge required for every pilot. This complex must be based on the requirements for graduates of the officers academy and contain classification requirements. We are dealing here with the specialized knowledge which is actually and immediately required by pilots for the execution of their combat assignments. It must remain on a constant level during the entire active service period of the pilot. The recognition that usable knowledge must be constantly repeated since the things that have been learned start to be forgotten after about 3 months, makes it necessary to pay great attention to the matter of retention of knowledge. Retention of knowledge is primarily repetition. However one frequently hears the following: "We have gone through this instruction three times already." This is an example of the selection of a wrong method. Too much of what is still known had been repeated. The participants in the instruction had not been forced to collaborate and their mental potential was not completely used. They felt bored, and the instruction had failed. The methods for repetition course must be fundamentally different from the original learning of a subject matter. Many options are available for this.

They range from seminar to test and from consultation to exchange of experience and direct instruction in technology, where theoretical factors are combined with practical assignments.

The second priority is the constant conveyance of new knowledge. Planning of this priority is an extremely important task. Its content and extent cannot be uniform in all regiments, but depends considerably on the training level of the pilots.

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This priority also includes the organized study of VS [classified] material and open literature published by the LSK/LV (Air Force and Air Defense Command). Organized study does not just mean the perusal of several articles in a certain area and at a certain time. Organized study means that studies proceed according to predetermined priorities, that the instructor has familiarized himself with the problems in advance, and that the subject matter is discussed in common.

The third priority comprises the assessment of the pilots' knowledge. According to flight operations regulations, an annual test in the different specialties of advanced specialized training is required. This complex is regulated by issuance of orders. However, regardless of these tests, each instruction course must be started or closed with one or several control questions. It is the purpose of these control questions to ascertain whether the pilots have sure command of the requisite knowledge and skills and are in a position of using them in practice to great advantage.

Hints for the Conduct of Instruction

In principle, every superior has to train his subordinates. It is incorrect that a pilot conducts this training because he has a good knowledge of the respective specialized field. This does not mean that such officers should not be included in the preparation of instruction but the service regulations for commanders and their deputies and for the chiefs of the services prescribe who is responsible for a specific course of instruction.

In order to obtain high quality, the following steps must be observed without fail in the preparations of instruction:

1. Clarification of the progression of instruction;
2. Specification of goals in accordance with concrete conditions, establishment of partial goals;
3. Grouping of the subject matter into a logical sequence with a concurrent check on one's own knowledge and perfecting of this knowledge, where required;
4. Coordination of content with other specialized areas;
5. Utilization of the educational potential of the collective by way of setting high requirements and by critical assessment of performances;
6. Allocating the time available for instruction by determining how much time is required for specific didactic functions such as introduction, conveyance, consolidation, and control;

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7. Planning of reserve time and preparation of reserve subject material.

The superior will have to control the conclusion of the preparations and to confirm the outline of the instruction course.

FOOTNOTE

1. "Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII. Parteitag der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands." Berichterstatter: Genosse Erich Honecker (Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth SED Party Congress. Reporter: Comrade Erich Honecker), Berlin 1971, p 69.

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BUILD-UP OF FRG NAVY SCORED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 105C-109C

[By Capt Dr K. Baerwinkel]

/Text/ With DM 46.4 billion, according to NATO data, the FRG naval armament budget for 1975 has reached a new record, which makes it clear that the material bases of the FRG's imperialist policy of aggression are being expanded. Further increases are planned for the next few years. The struggle against imperialism requires us to keep in view its activities of material preparation for a new world war, increasingly manifested also in naval armament, to unmask them publicly and to take them into account in our military activity.

The Connection Between the Operational Concept, Armament Planning and the New Command Structure of the FRG Navy

The war aims, the operational concept deriving from them, armament planning and the structure of the FRG Navy are closely connected. The war aims form the basis of armament plans, for the buildup and structure of the armed forces. Conversely, a given state of development of the material preparations for war promotes the further shaping of the war aims. In this, the influential armament concerns have an extremely stimulating effect on the way armament production and the war aims develop, in the interest of achieving high armament profits. The influence which the military industrial complex also exercises in naval matters in the FRG constitutes a concrete danger for peace and must not be underestimated.¹ The discovery of these connections puts us in an even better position to unmask the war aims against socialism, veiled by the myth of an existing

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threat. The "new navy concept" for the FRG Navy was issued in 1971/72. The preparatory work had been accomplished by the "Basic Study of the Navy Concept," which was to replace the Wegner study of 1962 by taking "all current facts" into account.

By "current facts" was not meant the turning away from aggressive war policy as a result of government practice followed by the SPD/FDP coalition, but continuation of this policy, with adjustment to the changed conditions of the international balance of strength.² The basic ideas of the "new concept" were confirmed by Vice Admiral Kuehnle, the former inspector of the FRG Navy (retired since 1 April 1975), when he said: "It proceeds from the premise that the Baltic Sea, the North Sea and the maritime areas in between form a strategic entity."³

This "concept" includes the effort of the Bonn naval leadership to constantly extend its operational area by utilizing NATO strategy and to fulfill even better its "combat mission east of Bornholm." At the same time, there is a focusing on the so-called "coping with crises," about which Kuehnle has the following to say: "By its presence, by appearing on the high seas and by being able to operate in multinational units, a navy is especially well suited for demonstrating interest in behalf of national power.... This configuration... obviously leads to conclusions regarding the type of means of naval war."⁴ This is propaganda for a political-military concept which continues the aggressive aims directed against the socialist states. In this connection, specific possibilities are emphasized of the FRG Navy--by making use of the high seas--engaging in provocations at any time, and even in times of peace, occupying favorable positions against the socialist states. The Bonn militarists demand the further buildup of the Federal Navy through a comprehensive armament program, extending to the mid-eighties, oriented toward the equipment of modern combat units. Thanks to sizable results in past FRG Navy armament, the leadership of the FRG Navy can depend on an arm with fighting capacity, ever ready for attack, politically and militarily, and, according to its own data, comprising about 300 ships and 200 planes at the beginning of 1975.

According to Western data, for arms and equipment alone, an average per year of DM 560 million was spent for the FRG Navy from 1957 to 1969, and for the period 1970-1974 the amount of money appropriated increased markedly, with a planned yearly average of DM 725 million. In the future, too, the material for further armament development in the FRG Navy are to be increased substantially. Among other things, in the armament budget for 1975, for research, development and testing DM 11 million are openly allocated for patrol boats, DM 8 million for frigates, DM 17 million for the air-to-ship missile Kormoran, DM 13 million for naval guided-missile systems, as well as DM 580 million for procurement.⁵

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The myth of an existing threat continues to be used as a rationale for the "new naval concept," with Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark and southern Norway, as well as the "sealanes, and thus imports," allegedly being threatened militarily by the socialist states. Even the energy and oil crisis, a result of imperialist policy, is used to support the demand for a strong military presence to protect the sealanes and the oil-drilling installations in the North Sea. At the same time, the myth of an existing threat, attuned cleverly and with every refinement to the various layers of the population, contradicts the assertion in Bonn that the Federal Armed Forces do not require the image of an enemy. The FRG naval leadership does everything possible to incite members of the Federal Navy with even greater effect to anticommunism, to manipulate them in the interest of imperialism, to corrupt them even more effectively and thus to get them ready for war against socialism.⁶ Also to be interpreted as further preparations for war is the fact that the Federal Navy conducted 10 naval exercises in 1973 and that in 1974 altogether 35 exercises with NATO units were planned. These increased activities confirm our estimate that the aggressive character of imperialism has not changed in any way.

The "new naval concept" also includes the "Revision of the Naval Command Structure" issued in 1973, introduced in stages during a period of about 2 years and comprising three areas of command:

1. The Naval Command (in Gluecksburg) with preponderantly operational tasks, in which all operational units and installations, including the supply fleet and the amphibian transport group, are combined.
2. The Naval Office (in Wilhelmshaven) with tasks in the fields of training, armament and naval medical service as well as the posts and installations assigned to them.
3. The Naval Support Command (in Wilhelmshaven), in which all ongoing support tasks (supply of materiel, system maintenance, transports, and so forth) are combined. This new installation was inaugurated on 1 October 1974.

Through the restructuring of the FRG Navy a "heightening of the presence of the naval forces" is to be achieved. The operational units are to be supplied better and restrained less from the aggressive tasks intended for them. At the same time, the new structure is to make possible tighter and more flexible organization, thereby attaining "greater economy and rationalization of operations." The intention here is to tackle the increasing operational costs, which, at the expense of investment in physical assets, reached 70.9 percent in the Federal Armed Forces in 1972. The yearly cost of operating the destroyer squadron of the "Fletcher" type was given as DM 26.1 million in 1968 and is reported to have risen to DM 31.1 million in 1972.⁷ These and similar arguments above all serve

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to attain even greater allocations for armament. The prominent attempts in public to reduce costs and to operate more economically must not be allowed to conceal the fact that the "new command structure" is primarily aimed at further adjustment to the requirements of modern war and at more careful consideration of problems arising from weaponry developments. New paths are to be found for further arming of the FRG Navy in the interest of increasing the aggressive power of the navy.

Sights Set Mainly on Intensification of Armament

Also in the realm of FRG naval armament, an increasing intensification of armament is to be noted. This is a phenomenon arising primarily from the rapid development of war technology and the increasing "moral obsolescence" of weapon systems.

This process must be viewed in the context of the war policy of the system of imperialist domination and especially of the activities of the armament monopolies. There is no such thing as automatic development of war technology. The intensification of armament is viewed as follows by the military of the FRG Navy: "The cost of all weapons systems, and to a very special degree the cost of the big weapons system constituted by the warship, will escalate in such a way that the number of vessels to be manufactured and to be maintained will decrease more and more. Since conversely the combat value of the individual vessel increases continually owing to docking installations, combat data processing, automation and far-reaching more accurate and highly effective weapons systems..., the total effectiveness to a large extent remains constant in the end."⁸ These ideas deriving from the technical development of modern weapons find expression in armament planning. The aims, recognizable in the context of the "naval concept," to expand modern weapons systems are tied in with long-term projects for supplementary construction, changes in armament and modernization directed toward substantially raising the combat value of units. More than in the past, when the quantitative development of naval forces was in the foreground, it will in future be a question of paying attention to the processes of intensification of FRG naval armament. It is wrong in statements about the aggressiveness of the Federal Navy to be content with presenting the amount of FRG naval forces and to compare it with the data of the preceding year. The increasing intensification of armament is apparent from the projects announced by the Bonn naval leadership for the seventies and eighties, aimed at further expanding a "modern, highly maneuverable, flexible navy." On the basis of Western data, let me point out a few of these projects:

1. Modernization of the destroyer of the "Hamburg" type by eliminating the third 100 mm tower and including "Exocet" launchers.

Further modernization of the three missile destroyers of the "Luetjens" type up to the weapons system "Standard Missile 1b," primarily to increase their range.

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The destroyers of the "Fletcher" type, hailing still from World War II, are removed. Starting about 1979/80, they, as well as the destroyers of the "Hamburg" type and the frigates of the "Cologne" type, are to be substituted by the planned newly built NATO frigate type "122," a ship of about 2,500 tons equipped with ship-to-ship and antiaircraft missiles as well as helicopters. Eight NATO countries (The United States, Great Britain, the FRG, France, Norway, Turkey, the Netherlands and Belgium) are participating in this project.

The increasing intensification of armament through modern weapons systems and equipping of destroyers is reflected, among other things, in increasing prices of new construction. If a destroyer of the "Hamburg" type still cost DM 105 million, a destroyer of the "Luetjens" type costs as much as DM 207 million. Despite a comparatively high mass production of about 80 ships, the price of the planned Frigate 122 is already estimated at DM 250 million.

2. The 10 patrol boats of the "Zobel" type have been modernized and equipped with central firing guidance and wire-guided torpedoes. Toward the end of the seventies, these ships are to be replaced by Type 162 hydrofoil craft. This is something the FRG, the United States and Italy have developed, with the model "Tucumeari" already having been exhibited to NATO military leaders. The "Jaguar" type patrol boats are to be replaced by 30 type 143 and 148 missile launching patrol boats, most of which have already been delivered. The construction of 20 ships of the type 148 alone is estimated to cost more than DM one billion.

3. In the past few years, the FRG Navy has received 18 type 206 modern submarines, which means it has 24 new submarines all told. These are equipped with eight torpedo tubes, largely of nonmagnetic material and intended especially for use in shallow waters endangered by depth charges. On the occasion of the inauguration of the first type 206 ships in 1973, the acting inspector of the FRG Navy, Rear Admiral Von Schroeter, described this weapons system as "the most modern and capable of its kind in the world."⁹ For the future, with the rationale of an alleged "threat at the flanks to reinforcements in the southern North Sea," fast antisubmarine submarines have been announced, which are said to be indispensable. At the end of December 1974, the FRG and Norway concluded an agreement concerning the joint development of the type 210 submarine. The process of intensification in submarine construction is apparent, among other things, if one considers that the cost of type 206 submarines are given as more than DM 400 million.

4. Mine-detecting forces are being modernized by converting to fast mine-sweepers, and are being "made more efficient" in their armament, especially through remote-controlled sweeping equipment. At the same time, helicopters are being tested for mine-sweeping.

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5. The naval aviation squadron is to be modernized with the type "F-104G" by the end of the seventies. After that, a switch is planned to the multi-purpose MRCA fighter plane, which is expected to perform well "if deployed at sea." Meanwhile, a beginning has been made with deliveries of the "Sea King" combat helicopter, meant to further heighten the FRG Navy's combat strength.

The navy commander, Vice Admiral Hartwig, has been full of praise for the intensification of the FRG naval armament, with an anti-Soviet thrust: "In the eighties modernization will enable the FRG Navy to never again occupy a backward position technologically vis-a-vis the East."¹⁰ Such utterances reveal the traditional aggressive spirit of imperialist German naval militarism, which continues despite the defeats in the world wars. The allied Baltic navies of the Warsaw Pact will not fail to counter these declared objectives appropriately.

Increasing Armament Integration

For political, economic and military reasons, the FRG military is demanding increased integration of armament within NATO. In connection with the visit of the NATO Military Committee to the FRG in September 1974, FRG Secretary of State Berkhan called for more effective cooperation in the armament sector in order to smoothen "the way to European political union." FRG Minister of Defense Leber, at the last Brussels conference of NATO defense ministers, went so far as to state his readiness, in the interest of quicker standardization, to buy the second-best weapons system if as many nations as possible share it.¹¹ The former chairman of the NATO Military Committee General Steinhoff, too, became an active advocate of the "necessity of West European defense cooperation" when he criticized the NATO naval forces for having 100 different ship categories above the size of destroyers, 36 different fire-guidance radar instruments and 40 different large-caliber naval artillery pieces. Each country requires its own suppliers, he stated.¹² In a similar vein, an FRG naval officer declared: "The high cost of modern weapons systems...is acceptable only if there is correspondingly high production. Much more than heretofore, this forces the treaty partners to cooperate wherever possible and, if required, to divide tasks among themselves."¹³

If one sums up these demands, made from different points of view, it is clear that armament integration is advocated for political reasons, military reasons and reasons of the armament industry. These are activities we have to reckon with despite the existing contradictions between the NATO partners. The development of NATO projects must be seen as part of the trend toward international armament concerns in the naval area, especially in the highly monopolized supply industry, such as the electrical and electronic industry, the missile industry and engine construction. It has to be considered here that, according to Western data, about

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60 percent of the cost of maintaining modern warships is taken up by electronics and armament alone. Nor can skeptical points of view fundamentally change the increasing armament integration--such as have been expressed, for instance, by Admiral of the Fleet Fuchs, retired, who commented on the prospects of the determinations made in the Eurogroup as follows: "In the area of naval forces, the road is likely to be especially steep and rocky. National egotisms in the technical and economic areas as well as differences as to ideas of employment are erecting considerable obstacles here....Hopes for an armament pool are still very remote." At the same time, Fuchs makes himself the advocate of the national interests of armament industry, saying: "Civilian technology has always been decisively fertilized by the production of arms. If these are purchased abroad, there is great danger of technological desiccation in one's own country."¹⁴ Such utterances reveal the different interests of the armament industry regarding armament integration. In the end, these forces pursue no other aim than likewise to make armament integration prevail, and thus to increase their own share in the market. The strategy is to increase production and sales at the expense of one's partners, in the interest of increased profit. The anticipated new projects in the field of armament integration will lead to a further increase of the combat strength of the NATO naval forces and to a buildup of the position of the FRG Navy within NATO.

From the point of view of material war preparations, the trends of FRG naval armament underline the evaluation by the Minister for National Defense, Army Gen H. Hoffmann, given before the graduates of the military academies in 1974: "We harbor no illusions of any kind about the fact that the armed forces of the United States, the FRG and NATO as a whole confront us as a military machine with the most modern weapons and to a large extent ready for war--the most dangerous and strongest imperialism has ever produced."¹⁵ For members of the People's Navy, this results in the class mission to continue to constantly increase combat readiness, in order to insure fulfillment of the main military task set by the Eighth Party Congress of the SED in our area of responsibility.

FOOTNOTES

1. Schubert, H.: In MILITAERWESEN, Edition C, Berlin, Nov 1973, p 98 ff.
2. Henze, K.: In MILITAERWESEN, Edition C, Berlin, Jan 1974, p 104 ff.
3. In HANSA (Hamburg), Issue 2, 1974, p 75.
4. Ibid.
5. WEHRPOLITISCHE INFORMATIONEN of 21 Nov 1974.

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6. Cf Verner, W.: In PARTEIARBEITER, Berlin, Special Issue 1, 1974, p 32.
7. Feck, H.: In WEHRKUNDE, Munich, Jul 1973, p 366.
8. Feck, H.: In KOEHLERS FLOTTENKALENDER, 1975, p 194.
9. In HANSA, Hamburg, Issue 14, 1973, p 1347.
10. Pressegesprach. In MARINE, Wilhelmshaven, Issue 3, 1974, p 1.
11. SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG of 12 December 1974.
12. EUROPA-ARCHIV of 25 Jul 1974.
13. Feck, H.: Ibid., p 195.
14. In TRUPPENPRAXIS, Cologne, Issue 10, p 806.
15. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Berlin, Edition A of 12 October 1974.

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SHIP SECURITY MEASURES PROMOTED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jun 75 pp 115C-118C

[By Comdr R. Gerstaecker, instructor]

/Text/ A prerequisite for fulfilling sea combat tasks is to qualify all crews for maintaining the staying and fighting power of their ship/boat in the face of any type of damage resulting from enemy action, wreckage or heavy weather.

Ship security is of great significance also in modern naval combat. This can be demonstrated irrefutably and convincingly with many examples from the history of naval war.

This article is intended to contribute to facilitating the understanding of the role and significance of ship security and to integrate it correctly in overall training.

Definitions

Ship security is closely tied to the terms of "staying and fighting power." By staying power of a ship is meant the ability of ship and crew to cope with damage from combat or wreckage by maintaining or restoring the combat qualities of the ship. Staying power depends on the construction of the ship and on the daily fulfillment of a combination of administrative and technical tasks by the crew.

Factors contributing to determining the staying power of a ship are:

--unsinkability;

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--safety from fire and explosions;

--staying power of equipment and weaponry.

By fighting power of a ship is meant the ability of the ship, owing to its tactical and technical qualities, to deal the enemy annihilating blows, to withstand his blows and, at the same time, as far as possible to maintain one's own staying power.

The fighting power of a ship depends on:

--construction of the hull;

--the complex of armament and technical equipment;

--the state of training;

--the moral-political state of the crew

Aims and Tasks of Ship Security Training

The aim of ship security training consists in enabling all members of the crew under great physical and psychological burdens--especially in difficult hydrometeorological conditions and under the effect of water, fire, smoke and quick changes in ship stability--to fulfill combat tasks, and to maintain the staying and fighting power of the ship under the most difficult conditions. To equate ship security with "countering leaks and fire," as one can hear and read it now and then, is not permissible. It is a very limited way of looking at things, for countering leaks and fire is but one of many tasks of ship security.

Apart from the countering leaks and fire, the tasks of ship security include:

--maintaining the staying power of armament and technology;

--eliminating damage to equipment and armament;

--maintaining reserve floating capacity;

--restoring normal stability by compensating for out-of-trim and heel positions;

--maintaining and installing shipboard communications and means of communications;

--strengthening waterproof ship construction;

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- preventing or limiting the spread of water in the ship;
- securing ship seals;
- implementing salvage operations, combined with first aid, transport of wounded, as well as deactivation, disinfection and poison control;
- insuring air supply and regulation of temperature;
- employing of ship's divers and carriers of compressed air equipment.

This list does not claim to be complete, but it doubtlessly permits statements about the role and significance of ship security. Furthermore, it outlines the scope of tasks of ship security and underlines the requirement of enlisting all members of the crew in ship security training.

Position of Ship Security Training in Overall Training

Proceeding from the tasks of ship security, from its significance for ship and crew and from the role of everyone on board in ship security, one can rightly say that ship security training is a principal branch of training. In assigning roles in ship security, it is a rule that the crews of battle stations are responsible for ship security at their battle stations.

All members of the crew, whether officers, midshipmen, petty officers or seamen, are involved in shipboard ship security. This cannot be otherwise, for ship security groups left to fend for themselves simply cannot meet all the demands made in regard to ship security in modern naval combat. What is required are well-organized, mutually attuned and practiced actions of the entire crew. Given below is an example from the history of naval warfare in World War II which is intended to underline the significance of ship security.

On 21 September 1941, during the heroic defense of Odessa, the Soviet destroyer Besposhchadnyy was attacked by 22 enemy planes. Two aerial bombs hit the bow, damaging it badly. It was therefore necessary to cut the bow of the destroyer. Despite this complex damage, the ship was maintained afloat and could be towed away. Having been restored, the destroyer received another hit by a bomb, which went through the upper deck and the double bottom. Water and fuel oil penetrated into the boilerroom, and a fire broke out. The trim reached 1.75 meters, the heel 14 degrees. The situation seemed hopeless.

The crew, circumspect and ready for sacrifice, fought for its ship, however, aided only by emergency (flashlight) lighting. Under the direction of the GA-V /expansion unknown/ commander, the ship, which had been believed lost, was saved because all possibilities of ship security were utilized. To

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cope with ship security in such complex conditions, with such damage, pre-supposes political-ideological maturity, high morale and--apart from courage and determination, apart from excellent coordination and tight leadership--solid training.

It is therefore necessary to enlist all members of the crew in ship security training and to take advantage of every opportunity for complex combat-related training. This includes not only pertinent teaching and conducting training in the ship security room but training on shipboard, in port and while cruising on the high seas.

Measures to Maintain Staying Power

It appears appropriate to deal in more detail with staying power, because it is the main factor which determines the fighting power of the ship.

Unsinkability

The ability of the ship to remain capable of staying afloat and to keep its stability in the face of damage to the hull and of flooding of one or more departments is called unsinkability. The unsinkability of a ship is influenced by:

- waterproof seals and solidity of the hull;
- reserve capability of staying afloat;
- stability;
- equipment with means and systems to fight leaks and fire;
- state of training of the crew.

Safety From Fire and Explosions

The suitability of a ship for preventing the start and spreading of fires and explosions on board through constructive measure and technical equipment is called safety from fire and explosions.

In this respect, crews are to observe the following fire safety measures:

Fire safety measures while handling open fires:

By open fire we understand smoking on board, welding equipment and soldering irons in operation, as well as burning candles and torches. Open fires are forbidden in ammunition storage areas, in fuel bunkers, near fuel lines, in dye and boatswain holds, in storage areas and in the immediate vicinity

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of easily flammable materials. All necessary work with open fires on shipboard therefore requires permission. Before work is started, the following fire safety measures are to be observed.

The person responsible checks the area in which the work with open fire is to be undertaken, as well as the adjoining areas.

All flammable materials are to be removed.

At the place of work, and in adjoining areas, posts with fire-fighting equipment are to be established.

The work area is to be well aired.

The GA-V commander checks the fire protection measures that have been taken.

When the work is completed, the areas are to be checked once more.

Fire safety measures to prevent fire and explosions in ammunition storage areas:

The most important fire safety measure is careful, systematic checking of temperature and humidity. When the temperature in storage areas exceeds 30 degrees centigrade, the room is to be cooled by ventilators. If this is insufficient and the temperature exceeds 35 degrees centigrade, the cargo must be sprinkled. If this is insufficient to prevent a fire, the cargo is to be flooded.

Fire safety measures in storing fuels and lubricants:

Fuels and lubricants can evaporate at normal temperatures. A concentration of fuel and lubricant vapors of more than 1 percent in the air constitutes an explosive mixture. Fuel and lubricants vapors settle in the lower parts of rooms, can concentrate there and can explode if open fires are improperly handled. Therefore, fuels and lubricants are to be kept only in closed containers. Easily flammable spilled liquids are to be removed immediately. Temperature and airing are factors which have an effect on secure storing of liquid fuels.

Fire protection measures to prevent spontaneous combustion:

Spontaneous combustion is a process in which a material starts to burn without being affected by an external source of heat.

Wood shavings, as well as rope, wool waste, tarpaulin saturated with oil or damp with oil, tend to initiate spontaneous combustion. Therefore, all

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security measures concerning the storing of these materials are to be observed consistently. The following steps need to be observed:

- easily flammable materials are to be stored dry and safe from fire;
- storage rooms are to be aired regularly in order to avoid high temperatures;
- easily flammable materials are to be checked constantly and must not be stored together with dyes and solvents;
- fire-extinguishing materials are always to be ready for use.

Staying Power of Equipment and Weaponry

By staying power of equipment and weaponry is meant their capacity to maintain tactical-technical qualities or regain them in case of damage.

These elements of staying power are insured through manifold constructive measures when the ship is planned and built, through the quality of means of fighting leaks and fires and of means for protecting the ship from various types of arms. Effective, too, are administrative-technical measures directed toward keeping the hull in flawless, hermetically shut condition and toward insuring the readiness for use of armaments, equipment and means of ship security. Not least, the state of training of the crew in ship security has an effect on the elements of staying power.

One could make further detailed remarks about the elements of staying power and subdivide them, but this would exceed the purpose of this article. It is, however, necessary to take a closer look at the element of unsinkability.

The Struggle for the Unsinkability of the Ship

The aim of the struggle for unsinkability consists in preventing the loss of the ship through combat damage or wreckage and, as far as possible, restoring its seaworthiness and fighting power. This requires that the crew initiate immediate measures in case of combat damage or wreckage with a view to maintaining the staying and fighting power of the ship. Here one is to proceed as follows:

Determining damage, fire and incursion of water:

In case of violent motions, shocks, detonations or other effects on the ship, the crew without awaiting further orders, immediately checks the departments and areas in order to determine incursion of water and technological damage, if any. If there is incursion of water and/or damage, this is to be reported instantly to the command of the combat sector, and first measures are to be taken in the struggle for unsinkability. First measures are:

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- sealing off leaks;
- shoring up bulkheads, doors and hatchways;
- caulking pipes;
- shutting off installations and equipment.

Limiting the spreading of water in the ship and restoring waterproof seals:

Limiting the spreading of water is decisive in the fight for the unsinkability of the ship. On the result of this struggle often depends the fate of crew and ship. The following actions are required:

- turning on pumping equipment;
- caulking of leaks and tears in the hull;
- reinforcing bulkheads, hatchways and doors.

The caulking of leaks occurs along with the pumping out of the room of the department. At the same time, all deformed and damaged waterproof bulkheads and covers must be reinforced.

Where water has come in, all damaged and endangered installations and equipment are to be shut down. After this, the waterproof sealing of the ship is to be restored. Here it is required to close and check doors, hatchways, manholes, ventilators and vents as well as to tighten catches and vents.

Insuring the cruising and maneuvering ability of the ship and the readiness of employment of weapons:

The cruising and maneuvering ability of the ship as well as the employment of weapons are made possible, on the one hand, by the mentioned measures and, on the other, by trimming the ship, that is, by eliminating or reducing out-of-trim and heel positions. These are, at the same time, measures to restore the stability of the ship.

The following conclusions may be drawn from the above:

Ship security is no necessary evil, for on it depends the staying and fighting power of a ship.

Ship security training is not a subordinate but a principal branch of training.

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Owing to the comprehensive requirements, ship security cannot be limited to ship security groups. Therefore every member of the crew is responsible for ship security at his battle station.

Solid ship security training makes possible the following:

--sure, determined and efficient action of all the crew in case of combat damage and wreckage;

--security of crew and ship;

--the maintenance of the staying and fighting power of a ship even under the most difficult circumstances;

--the fulfillment of combat tasks.

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